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ABSTRACT	  Females	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  become	  depressed	  and	  experience	  social	  anxiety	  than	  are	  males,	  and	  this	  sex	  difference	  emerges	  during	  adolescence.	  	  A	  difference	  in	  interpretation	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios	  has	  been	  posited	  as	  a	  potential	  causal	  factor	  of	  the	  sex	  differences	  in	  mood	  disorders.	  Females	  are	  also	  thought	  to	  place	  a	  higher	  value	  on	  social	  relationships	  than	  are	  males,	  which	  may	  cause	  them	  to	  view	  interpersonal	  relationships	  as	  more	  difficult,	  further	  affecting	  their	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events.	  	  To	  test	  these	  hypotheses,	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  of	  ambiguous	  events	  and	  perception	  of	  interpersonal	  difficulty	  were	  measured	  using	  the	  AIBQ	  in	  adolescents	  (aged	  12-­‐15)	  and	  young	  adults	  (22-­‐25).	  	  The	  participants	  also	  rated	  the	  level	  of	  perceived	  difficulty	  of	  different	  interpersonal	  relationships	  using	  the	  QIDA,	  such	  as	  romantic,	  peer,	  family,	  etc.	  	  Results	  showed	  that	  females	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  males	  to	  have	  negative	  explanations	  come	  to	  mind	  for	  ambiguous	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios,	  and	  had	  more	  negative	  beliefs	  than	  males	  about	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios.	  	  Adolescents	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  belief	  for	  social	  events	  than	  for	  nonsocial	  events,	  and	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  belief	  for	  social	  scenarios	  than	  were	  adults.	  	  All	  participants	  had	  more	  positive	  interpretations	  for	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  than	  social.	  	  No	  sex	  or	  age	  differences	  in	  positive	  interpretations	  or	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  were	  found.	  	  Future	  studies	  could	  track	  the	  changes	  as	  adolescents	  age	  and	  transition	  into	  young	  adulthood.	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  
	   Women	  are	  twice	  as	  likely	  as	  men	  to	  develop	  depression	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  lifetimes	  (Bromet	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  This	  female	  preponderance	  is	  a	  well-­‐documented	  epidemiological	  phenomenon:	  it	  has	  been	  consistently	  reported	  across	  many	  countries	  and	  has	  remained	  constant	  over	  the	  previous	  decades	  (Weissman	  &	  Klerman,	  1977;	  Weissman	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Wade,	  Cairney,	  &	  Pevalin,	  2002).	  	  Prior	  to	  puberty	  this	  gender	  disparity	  is	  not	  found.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  depression	  rate	  for	  boys	  equals	  or	  even	  outnumbers	  that	  of	  girls	  (Finch,	  Saylor,	  &	  Edwards,	  1985;	  Hankin,	  2009).	  By	  mid	  to	  late	  puberty,	  however,	  the	  rate	  of	  depressed	  girls	  surpasses	  that	  of	  boys,	  and	  remains	  greater	  throughout	  adulthood	  (Kessler	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  	  Thus,	  females	  appear	  to	  become	  more	  susceptible	  to	  depression	  immediately	  before	  and	  during	  puberty,	  marking	  adolescence	  as	  an	  important	  time	  in	  the	  etiology	  of	  depression	  (Nolen-­‐Hoeksema	  &	  Girgus,	  1994).	  	  	  Many	  different	  theories	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  gender	  difference	  in	  depression	  rates	  that	  arises	  during	  puberty,	  including	  hormone	  changes	  (Brooks-­‐Gunn	  &	  Warren,	  1989;	  Angold	  &	  Worthman,	  1993),	  transitioning	  social	  roles	  (Cyranowski,	  Frank,	  Young,	  &	  Shear,	  2000),	  frequency	  of	  negative	  life	  events	  (Hankin	  &	  Abramson,	  2001)	  and	  cognitive	  styles	  	  (Abramson,	  Metalsky,	  &	  Alloy,	  1989;	  Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Mathews	  &	  MacLeod,	  1994).	  	  The	  general	  cognitive	  vulnerability-­‐stress	  model	  (Hankin	  &	  Abramson,	  2001)	  suggests	  that	  hormones,	  transitioning	  social	  roles,	  and	  cognitive	  styles	  act	  as	  general	  and	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities	  that	  predispose	  individuals	  to	  depression	  when	  negative	  life	  events	  occur.	  	  Various	  researchers	  have	  expanded	  upon	  the	  cognitive	  vulnerability-­‐stress	  model	  to	  account	  for	  new	  findings	  in	  the	  depression	  literature.	  	  Most	  recently,	  Hyde	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  integrate	  different	  depression	  models	  in	  the	  “ABCs	  of	  Depression,”	  which	  states	  that	  Affective,	  Biological,	  and	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Cognitive	  factors	  confer	  vulnerability,	  especially	  in	  females,	  to	  depression	  in	  the	  face	  of	  stressful	  life	  events.	  	  The	  following	  sections	  review	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  ABC	  model,	  and	  then	  explore	  how	  negative	  interpretation	  biases	  may	  act	  as	  a	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  exposing	  female	  adolescents	  to	  greater	  rates	  of	  depression.	  	  	  
Affective	  and	  Biological	  Vulnerabilities	  Negative	  affectivity	  refers	  to	  the	  tendency	  to	  experience	  negative	  emotions	  more	  often	  and	  more	  strongly.	  	  Logically,	  adolescents	  exhibiting	  high	  negative	  affectivity	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  than	  adolescents	  with	  low	  negative	  affectivity	  to	  experience	  stronger	  negative	  emotions	  when	  confronted	  with	  difficult	  situations	  (Hyde,	  Mezulis,	  &	  Abramson,	  2008).	  	  Mezulis	  and	  colleagues	  (2006)	  found	  that	  children	  with	  high	  negative	  affectivity	  also	  experienced	  more	  negative	  life	  events	  and	  had	  more	  negative	  cognitive	  styles,	  both	  of	  which	  confer	  further	  vulnerability	  to	  depression.	  	  Though	  there	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  any	  gender	  differences	  in	  negative	  affectivity	  in	  adolescence	  (Else-­‐Quest,	  Hyde,	  Goldsmith,	  &	  Van	  Hulle,	  2006)	  there	  may	  be	  a	  greater	  variance	  in	  negative	  affectivity	  in	  girls,	  putting	  a	  slightly	  larger	  number	  of	  girls	  than	  boys	  in	  the	  highest	  range	  of	  negative	  affectivity.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  there	  may	  actually	  be	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  girls	  than	  boys	  at	  risk	  for	  developing	  depression	  due	  to	  a	  negative	  affectivity	  vulnerability,	  even	  though	  mean	  affectivity	  scores	  are	  equal	  (Hyde	  et	  al,	  2008).	  An	  additional	  pathway	  whereby	  negative	  affectivity	  may	  act	  is	  by	  enhancing	  the	  effects	  of	  hormone	  changes	  in	  adolescence.	  During	  puberty,	  hormones	  levels	  involved	  in	  both	  sexual	  maturation	  and	  stress	  reactivity	  change	  dramatically	  (Angold	  &	  Worthman,	  1993).	  Thus,	  these	  changes	  in	  hormones	  may	  increase	  negative	  affectivity	  in	  adolescence,	  amplifying	  already	  present	  vulnerability	  to	  depression	  (Spear,	  2000).	  	  Previous	  research	  has	  found	  that	  pubertal	  status	  of	  adolescent	  females	  is	  positively	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correlated	  to	  depression,	  and	  that	  as	  girls	  progress	  through	  puberty	  the	  probability	  that	  they	  will	  become	  depressed	  increases	  (Angold,	  Costello,	  &	  Worthman,	  1998).	  Other	  studies	  investigating	  hormone	  levels	  in	  particular	  have	  found	  that	  elevations	  in	  estrogen	  levels	  correlate	  positively	  with	  elevations	  in	  negative	  affect	  in	  adolescent	  females,	  and	  that	  estrogen’s	  effects	  on	  negative	  affect	  are	  amplified	  when	  combined	  with	  negative	  life	  events	  or	  social	  stressors	  (Brooks-­‐Gunn	  &	  Warren,	  1989).	  Together,	  these	  studies	  suggest	  that	  hormone	  levels	  may	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  depression	  in	  girls.	  	  In	  addition,	  girls	  exhibit	  a	  greater	  affiliative	  need	  to	  establish	  intimate	  relationships	  with	  others	  (Feingold,	  1994),	  and	  report	  more	  negative	  life	  events	  (Compas	  &	  Wagner,	  1991)	  than	  do	  boys.	  	  Cyranowski	  and	  colleagues	  (2000)	  suggest	  that	  the	  combination	  of	  latent	  affiliative	  differences,	  changes	  in	  hormone	  levels,	  social	  relationships,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  negative	  life	  events	  together	  predispose	  girls	  to	  develop	  depression	  in	  greater	  rates	  than	  boys.	  	  However,	  cognitive	  style,	  or	  the	  way	  in	  which	  individuals	  think	  about	  life	  events,	  is	  not	  included	  in	  Cyranowski	  and	  colleague’s	  (2000)	  model,	  yet	  may	  confer	  a	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  that	  interacts	  with	  negative	  affect	  and	  hormones	  to	  predispose	  female	  adolescents	  to	  depression	  (Hankin	  &	  Abramson,	  2001;	  Hyde	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  	  	  
Cognitive	  Vulnerabilities	   	  Theories	  that	  explore	  cognitive	  styles	  and	  vulnerabilities	  posit	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  individuals	  process	  information	  influences	  the	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  mood	  disorders	  (Mathews	  &	  MacLeod,	  1994;	  Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Rapee	  &	  Heimberg,	  1997).	  	  Hankin	  and	  Abramson’s	  elaborated	  cognitive	  vulnerability-­‐transactional	  stress	  theory (Hankin	  &	  Abramson,	  2001)	  states	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  hormonal	  and	  social	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changes	  that	  occur	  during	  adolescence,	  generic	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  factors	  predispose	  adolescents	  to	  depression	  when	  they	  are	  confronted	  with	  negative	  life	  events.	  	  Mathews	  and	  MacLeod	  (1994)	  divide	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities	  into	  four	  main	  information-­‐processing	  biases:	  attention,	  memory,	  judgment,	  and	  interpretation.	  	  Hankin	  and	  Abramson	  (2001)	  also	  cite	  rumination	  responses,	  dysfunctional	  attitudes,	  and	  Abramson’s	  negative	  inferential	  style	  (Abramson	  et	  al.,	  1989)	  as	  additional	  generic	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities.	  Overall,	  these	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities—information-­‐processing	  biases,	  rumination	  responses,	  dysfunctional	  attitudes,	  and	  Abramson’s	  negative	  inferential	  style—predispose	  individuals	  to	  draw	  negative	  inferences	  and	  experience	  events	  in	  a	  more	  negative	  way	  (Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Cyranowski	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Hankin	  &	  Abramson,	  2001).	  	  The	  next	  two	  sections	  focus	  on	  two	  particular	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities,	  negative	  inferential	  style	  and	  negative	  interpretation	  bias,	  and	  review	  the	  relevant	  literature.	  	  
Cognitive	  Vulnerabilities:	  Negative	  Inferential	  Style	  One	  of	  the	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities	  in	  Hankin	  and	  Abramson’s	  (2001)	  elaborated	  cognitive	  vulnerability-­‐transactional	  stress	  theory	  is	  negative	  inferential	  style.	  	  Negative	  inferential	  style	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  assign	  stable	  or	  unstable,	  global	  or	  specific	  causes	  to	  one’s	  experiences.	  	  In	  a	  questionnaire	  of	  inferential	  style	  (Adolescent	  Cognitive	  Style	  Questionnaire,	  ACSQ;	  Hankin	  &	  Abramson,	  2002),	  participants	  imagine	  themselves	  in	  ambiguous	  scenarios,	  write	  potential	  explanations	  for	  the	  situations,	  and	  then	  rate	  on	  a	  7-­‐point	  Likert	  scale	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  situation’s	  explanation	  is	  internal	  (caused	  by	  the	  participant),	  stable	  (constant	  and	  unchangeable),	  and	  global	  (applies	  to	  other	  situations).	  	  An	  example	  ambiguous	  scenario	  is	  “an	  acquaintance	  fails	  to	  wave	  hello	  to	  you.”	  	  A	  possible	  explanation	  could	  be	  because	  the	  acquaintance	  does	  not	  like	  you	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(internal),	  could	  never	  like	  you	  (stable),	  and	  many	  other	  people	  will	  not	  like	  you,	  either	  (global).	  	  	  In	  a	  study	  with	  adolescents	  (ages	  11-­‐17)	  using	  the	  ACSQ,	  symptoms	  of	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  were	  found	  to	  positively	  correlate	  with	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities,	  as	  measured	  by	  negative	  inferential	  style	  (Hankin,	  2009).	  In	  addition,	  girls	  overall	  had	  a	  more	  negative	  inferential	  style	  than	  did	  boys.	  Girls	  also	  reported	  more	  stressors	  and	  depressive	  symptoms.	  This	  study	  provides	  tentative	  support	  for	  the	  Hankin	  and	  Abramson’s	  (2001)	  elaborated	  cognitive	  vulnerability-­‐transaction	  stress	  theory	  of	  depression	  by	  showing	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  and	  depression/anxiety	  symptoms,	  and	  also	  showed	  that	  both	  were	  higher	  in	  girls	  compared	  to	  boys.	  	  However,	  the	  theory	  postulates	  that	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities	  come	  before	  major	  depression,	  acting	  as	  a	  negative	  affect	  enhancer	  when	  negative	  life	  events	  occur.	  To	  test	  which	  comes	  first	  (cognitive	  vulnerability	  or	  depression),	  or	  whether	  they	  emerge	  simultaneously,	  the	  trajectory	  across	  age	  groups	  must	  be	  examined	  through	  a	  longitudinal	  study.	  The	  study	  by	  (Hankin,	  2009)	  provided	  a	  snapshot	  in	  time	  of	  adolescent	  depression,	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  support	  the	  temporal	  hypothesis	  that	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities	  and	  stressors	  precede	  depression.	  	  Mezulis,	  Funasaki,	  Charbonneau,	  &	  Hyde	  (2009)	  investigated	  the	  timeline	  of	  depression	  and	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  emergence	  by	  following	  adolescents	  over	  the	  course	  of	  five	  years	  (11,	  13,	  and	  15	  years	  of	  age),	  taking	  indices	  of	  depression,	  social	  stressors,	  and	  negative	  inferences	  scores	  (as	  measured	  by	  the	  Children’s	  Cognitive	  Style	  Questionnaire,	  CCSQ).	  	  In	  this	  study,	  depression	  symptoms	  in	  girls	  increased	  significantly	  over	  time:	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  boys	  and	  girls	  were	  depressed	  at	  age	  11,	  but	  by	  13	  and	  15	  significantly	  more	  girls	  than	  boys	  were	  depressed.	  Girls	  also	  experienced	  a	  greater	  increase	  in	  negative	  inferential	  style	  and	  number	  of	  social	  stressors.	  However,	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girls’	  negative	  cognitive	  style	  did	  not	  increase	  significantly	  compared	  to	  boys	  until	  age	  15,	  after	  the	  gender	  differences	  in	  depressive	  symptoms	  were	  noted.	  	  Mezulis	  and	  colleagues	  (2009)	  showed	  that	  gender	  differences	  in	  depressive	  symptoms	  (age	  13	  girls	  more	  depressed)	  precede	  the	  gender	  differences	  in	  cognitive	  style	  (age	  15	  girls	  more	  negative	  in	  cognitive	  style),	  contradicting	  the	  hypothesized	  direction	  of	  influence	  (i.e.	  negative	  inferences	  causing	  depression).	  	  Results	  from	  this	  study	  suggest	  gender	  differences	  in	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  do	  not	  emerge	  until	  middle	  to	  late	  adolescence,	  after	  the	  rise	  of	  depression	  and	  negative	  affect,	  and	  thus	  is	  a	  result	  of	  depression	  rather	  than	  a	  mediating	  variable	  in	  its	  development.	  	  Results	  from	  another	  longitudinal	  study	  on	  the	  timeline	  of	  negative	  inferences	  and	  depressive	  symptoms	  in	  adolescents	  by	  Calvete	  (2010)	  contradict	  those	  found	  by	  Mezulis	  and	  colleagues	  (2009).	  	  Calvete	  (2010)	  found	  a	  reversed	  order	  of	  appearance	  in	  adolescents	  aged	  14	  to	  17	  years,	  where	  sex	  differences	  in	  depressive	  symptoms	  followed	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  sex	  difference	  in	  cognitive	  style.	  	  Initial	  levels	  of	  negative	  inferences,	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  Adolescent	  Cognitive	  Style	  Questionnaire	  (ACSQ,	  complementary	  to	  the	  CCSQ),	  mediated	  the	  association	  between	  gender	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  manifestation	  of	  depressive	  symptoms	  six	  months	  later.	  	  This	  correlation	  between	  negative	  inferences	  and	  subsequent	  depressive	  symptoms	  was	  stronger	  for	  girls	  than	  for	  boys,	  suggesting	  that	  girls	  who	  demonstrated	  a	  negative	  inferential	  style	  were	  more	  vulnerable	  than	  are	  boys	  with	  negative	  inferential	  styles.	  	  Both	  Mezulis	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  and	  Calvete	  (2010)	  had	  relatively	  large	  sample	  sizes	  (336	  and	  853	  participants,	  respectively),	  and	  so	  the	  contradictory	  results	  may	  be	  attributable	  to	  the	  slight	  differences	  in	  age	  range	  (Calvete	  2010)	  and	  length	  of	  time	  over	  which	  the	  studies	  were	  conducted.	  	  Whereas	  Mezulis	  and	  colleagues	  (2009)	  interviewed	  early	  to	  mid	  adolescents	  (aged	  11-­‐15	  years)	  three	  times	  in	  two-­‐year	  intervals,	  Calvete	  (2010)	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interviewed	  mid	  to	  late	  adolescents	  (14-­‐17)	  twice,	  sixth	  months	  apart.	  	  If	  sex	  differences	  in	  depression	  rates	  are	  initially	  triggered	  by	  factors	  other	  than	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities,	  and	  then	  the	  emergence	  of	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities	  in	  mid	  to	  late	  adolescence	  continue	  to	  drive	  the	  sex	  differences	  even	  farther	  apart,	  then	  the	  apparent	  contradiction	  in	  results	  between	  the	  two	  studies	  may	  be	  resolved.	  	  To	  clarify	  the	  timeline	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  depression	  and	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  in	  adolescents,	  more	  longitudinal	  studies	  must	  be	  conducted	  over	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  ages.	  	  	  
Cognitive	  Vulnerabilities:	  Negative	  Interpretation	  Bias	  	  As	  stated,	  current	  models	  suggest	  that	  the	  more	  social	  stressors	  individuals	  experience,	  in	  combination	  with	  what	  inferences	  about	  the	  self	  they	  make	  in	  response	  to	  those	  social	  stressors,	  may	  predispose	  individuals	  to	  depression.	  	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  an	  individual	  resolves	  ambiguous	  situations—positively	  or	  negatively—may	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  negative	  events	  an	  individual	  perceives	  as	  having	  experienced.	  	  Thus,	  a	  tendency	  to	  interpret	  ambiguous	  events	  in	  a	  negative	  way	  (i.e.	  negative	  interpretation	  bias)	  may	  also	  predispose	  individuals	  to	  depression.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  scenario	  “an	  acquaintance	  fails	  to	  say	  hello”	  is	  ambiguous.	  	  However,	  if	  an	  individual	  immediately	  interprets	  this	  scenario	  negatively	  (i.e.	  he/she	  did	  not	  want	  to	  say	  hi),	  then	  the	  individual	  will	  assign	  either	  a	  negative,	  positive,	  or	  neutral	  inference	  to	  explain	  why	  (negative-­‐	  he/she	  does	  not	  like	  me;	  positive-­‐	  he/she	  likes	  me	  but	  did	  not	  have	  time	  to	  talk;	  neutral-­‐he/she	  just	  didn’t	  feel	  like	  saying	  hi).	  The	  individual’s	  initial	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ambiguous	  scenario	  could	  mediate	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  individual	  then	  infers	  a	  negative	  internal	  cause.	  	  Though	  there	  have	  been	  contradictory	  reports	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  stressful	  life	  events	  experienced	  by	  either	  sex	  (Calvete,	  2010;	  Mezulis	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  females	  may	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  negative	  events	  by	  interpreting	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everyday,	  ambiguous	  events	  in	  a	  more	  negative	  manner,	  thereby	  making	  an	  otherwise	  neutral	  experience	  more	  stressful.	  	  Thus,	  in	  addition	  to	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  negative	  inferences	  in	  depression,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  explore	  initial	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  events	  as	  well.	  	  Given	  that	  social	  issues	  are	  a	  major	  source	  of	  anxiety	  in	  adolescents	  (Gullone	  &	  King,	  1993;	  Westenberg,	  Gullone,	  Bokhorst,	  Heyne,	  &	  King,	  2007),	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events	  are	  especially	  important	  in	  the	  maintenance	  and	  development	  of	  depression	  for	  adolescents.	  	  Like	  depression,	  social	  anxiety	  increases	  in	  prevalence	  in	  early	  adolescence	  (Beesdo,	  2007),	  and	  affects	  females	  in	  disproportionate	  rates	  (14%	  for	  females,	  8	  %	  for	  males);	  (Beesdo,	  2007).	  	  Comorbidity	  surveys	  show	  that	  social	  anxiety	  and	  its	  clinical	  form	  social	  phobia	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  levels	  of	  depression	  in	  adolescents	  (Angold,	  Costello,	  Erkanli,	  &	  Worthman,	  1999).	  	  In	  fact,	  some	  authors	  suggest	  that	  depression	  in	  adolescence	  starts	  as	  social	  anxiety	  and	  proliferates	  (Kessler,	  Pfister,	  &	  Lieb,	  2000).	  	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  issues	  in	  adolescence,	  and	  the	  strong	  correlation	  between	  social	  anxiety	  and	  depression,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  bias	  toward	  making	  negative	  inferences	  and	  interpretations	  is	  specific	  to	  social	  scenarios,	  yet	  the	  difference	  between	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  is	  not	  noted	  in	  either	  of	  the	  cognitive	  styles	  questionnaires	  (ACSQ	  or	  CCSQ). Amir	  and	  colleagues	  (1998)	  investigated	  social	  interpretation	  bias	  in	  adults	  using	  The	  Interpretation	  Questionnaire	  (Amir,	  Foa,	  &	  Coles,	  1998)	  by	  asking	  participants	  to	  consider	  various	  self-­‐relevant,	  ambiguous	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios,	  and	  then	  to	  rate	  the	  likelihood	  that	  positive,	  negative,	  and	  neutral	  explanations	  would	  come	  to	  mind	  during	  that	  situation.	  	  The	  study	  found	  that	  individuals	  with	  social	  phobia	  rate	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  social	  events	  as	  more	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likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind,	  and	  positive	  interpretations	  of	  social	  events	  as	  less	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  than	  those	  with	  no	  anxiety	  or	  generalized	  anxiety.	  	  Those	  with	  social	  phobia	  also	  rated	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios	  as	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  to	  them	  than	  for	  ambiguous	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  By	  contrast,	  non-­‐anxious	  and	  generalized	  anxiety	  controls	  actually	  rated	  positive	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events	  as	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  to	  them	  than	  for	  ambiguous	  non-­‐social	  events.	  	  These	  results	  show	  a	  significant	  negative	  social	  interpretation	  bias	  in	  adults	  with	  social	  phobia,	  a	  result	  replicated	  by	  other	  studies	  (Brendle	  &	  Wenzel,	  2004;	  Constans,	  Penn,	  Ihen,	  &	  Hope,	  1999;	  Stopa	  &	  Clark,	  2000;	  Hirsch	  &	  Mathews,	  2000).	  	  Gender	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  bias	  among	  adults	  were	  not	  found	  (Amir	  et	  al.	  1998;	  Constans,	  Penn,	  Ihen,	  &	  Hope,	  1999),	  or	  were	  not	  investigated	  (Brendle	  &	  Wenzel,	  2004;	  Stopa	  	  Clark,	  2000;	  Hirsch	  &	  Mathews,	  2000).	   While	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  individuals	  with	  depression	  and	  social	  anxiety	  have	  more	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  events	  than	  individuals	  without	  mood	  disorders,	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  biases	  in	  depressed	  and	  anxious	  adults	  remains	  unclear.	  	  Huppert	  and	  colleagues	  (2003)	  controlled	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  negative	  affect	  and/or	  state	  anxiety,	  and	  found	  that	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events	  was	  predicted	  only	  by	  levels	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  but	  not	  by	  depression	  or	  generalized	  anxiety.	  	  However,	  a	  later	  study	  by	  Franklin	  and	  colleagues	  (2005)	  found	  that	  both	  social	  anxiety	  and	  depression	  positively	  correlated	  with	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  social	  events.	  Additionally,	  while	  some	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  social	  anxiety	  is	  characterized	  not	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  positive	  bias	  but	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  negative	  bias	  (Dickson	  and	  MacLeod	  2004;	  Luebbe,	  Bell,	  Allwood,	  Swenson,	  &	  Early,	  2010),	  other	  studies	  have	  found	  the	  reverse	  to	  be	  true	  (i.e.,	  lack	  of	  positive	  bias,	  Hirsch	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&	  Mathews,	  2000;	  Constans	  et	  al.,	  1999)	  or	  even	  that	  social	  anxiety	  is	  characterised	  by	  discounting	  of	  positive	  social	  events	  (Vassilopoulous	  &	  Banerjee,	  2010).	  Extending	  the	  research	  into	  younger	  populations	  with	  children	  and	  adolescents,	  most	  studies	  have	  also	  found	  evidence	  of	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  of	  ambiguous	  events	  in	  subjects	  with	  social	  anxiety	  and	  depression.	  	  Studies	  have	  found	  that	  children	  and	  adolescents	  with	  anxiety	  disorders	  interpret	  ambiguous	  events	  more	  negatively	  than	  those	  without	  anxiety	  disorders	  (e.g.:	  Bögels	  &	  Zigterman,	  2000;	  Bögels,	  Snieder,	  &	  Kindt,	  2003;	  Chorpita,	  Albano,	  &	  Barlow,	  1996;	  P.	  Muris,	  Merckelbach,	  &	  Damsma,	  2000;	  Peter	  Muris,	  Rapee,	  Meesters,	  Schouten,	  &	  Geers,	  2003;	  Creswell	  &	  O'Connor,	  2011).	  Furthermore,	  other	  studies	  have	  found	  evidence	  that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  ambiguous	  scenario	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  anxiety	  the	  participant	  has	  influence	  the	  valence	  of	  interpretation,	  i.e.	  positive	  or	  negative	  (Bögels	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  For	  example,	  socially	  anxious	  children	  and	  adolescents	  make	  more	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events	  than	  for	  ambiguous	  nonsocial	  events	  (Muris	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  	  	  	  One	  study	  in	  particular	  by	  Vassilopoulos	  and	  Banerjee	  (2008)	  investigated	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  in	  participants	  (ages	  11-­‐13)	  with	  no	  anxiety,	  social	  anxiety,	  and	  depression.	  The	  study	  measured	  the	  subjects’	  tendency	  to	  discount	  positive	  social	  events	  and	  catastrophize	  negative	  social	  events	  using	  the	  Positive	  Social	  Events	  Discounting	  Questionnaire	  and	  the	  Negative	  Social	  Events	  Catastrophization	  Questionnaire	  (PSEDQ	  and	  NSECQ;	  Vassilopoulous	  &	  Banerjee	  2008).	  	  The	  results	  of	  this	  study	  found	  that	  participants	  with	  social	  anxiety	  endorsed	  more	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events	  and	  rejected	  more	  positive	  interpretations	  than	  those	  without	  social	  anxiety.	  This	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  remained	  even	  after	  including	  depressive	  symptoms	  as	  a	  possible	  mediating	  factor,	  suggesting	  that	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios	  is	  specific	  to	  social	  anxiety,	  a	  result	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confirmed	  by	  an	  earlier	  study	  (Voncken,	  Bögels,	  &	  Peeters,	  2007).	  Though	  Vassilopoulos	  &	  Banerjee	  (2008)	  found	  that	  socially	  anxious	  adolescents	  make	  more	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  mildly	  negative	  and	  positive	  ambiguous	  social	  events,	  the	  study	  did	  not	  report	  whether	  the	  relationship	  between	  interpretation	  bias	  and	  anxiety/depression	  varied	  between	  the	  sexes.	  	  	  A	  later	  study	  by	  Miers,	  Blote,	  Bogels,	  &	  Westenberg	  (2008)	  specifically	  investigated	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretations	  of	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  	  To	  measure	  interpretation	  bias,	  	  the	  researchers	  developed	  the	  Adolescent	  Interpretation	  Bias	  Questionnaire	  (AIBQ),	  which	  presents	  five	  social	  and	  five	  nonsocial	  ambiguous,	  hypothetical,	  and	  self-­‐relevant	  events	  to	  participants.	  	  A	  limitation	  of	  most	  previous	  versions	  of	  ambiguous	  scenarios	  tests	  (e.g.	  the	  Interpretation	  Questionnaire,	  Amir	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  is	  that	  they	  force	  the	  participant	  to	  choose	  one	  dominant	  answer	  or	  to	  rank	  the	  positive,	  negative,	  and	  neutral	  explanations	  against	  each	  other,	  but	  not	  against	  an	  absolute	  scale.	  This	  prevents	  the	  participant	  from	  assigning	  the	  same	  probability	  that	  the	  thought	  would	  occur	  to	  them	  to	  more	  than	  one	  explanation.	  Therefore,	  answers	  for	  any	  one	  individual	  become	  an	  averaged	  score	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  more	  nuanced	  rating	  that	  may	  show	  the	  existence	  of	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  biases.	  	  Because	  other	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  anxiety	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  negative	  explanations	  in	  comparison	  to	  controls,	  but	  that	  anxious	  individuals	  do	  not	  differ	  from	  controls	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  generating	  positive	  explanations,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  positive	  and	  negative	  bias	  (Dickson	  and	  MacLeod	  2004).	  Most	  of	  the	  previous	  interpretation	  questionnaires	  also	  do	  not	  ask	  the	  participants	  to	  decide	  which	  explanation	  is	  most	  believable,	  preventing	  the	  participant	  from	  reflecting	  on	  the	  explanations	  and	  making	  a	  judgment	  about	  the	  situation’s	  cause.	  	  Though	  individuals	  may	  initially	  interpret	  an	  event	  negatively,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  he	  or	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she	  ultimately	  believes	  the	  interpretation	  becomes	  a	  determinant	  in	  how	  he	  or	  she	  views	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  event	  (Clark	  et	  al	  1997).	  	  If	  the	  individual	  ultimately	  rejects	  the	  negative	  interpretation	  and	  instead	  believes	  the	  positive	  interpretation,	  then	  the	  Interpretation	  Questionnaire,	  which	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  believability	  aspect,	  	  may	  falsely	  assign	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  to	  someone	  who	  actually	  is	  positive	  in	  his	  or	  her	  beliefs.	  	  The	  AIBQ	  corrects	  for	  both	  limitations	  (1.	  ranking	  of	  interpretations	  and	  2.	  lack	  of	  belief	  question)	  by	  including	  separate	  Likert-­‐rating	  scales	  for	  the	  positive,	  negative,	  and	  neutral	  explanations	  for	  each	  of	  the	  five	  social	  and	  five	  nonsocial	  ambiguous	  events,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  follow-­‐up	  question	  asking	  which	  of	  the	  three	  explanations	  is	  most	  believable	  for	  each	  event.	  	  By	  including	  the	  additional	  belief	  question,	  the	  AIBQ	  also	  partially	  accounts	  for	  judgment	  bias—or	  an	  overestimation	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  particular	  negative	  event	  (Foa,	  Franklin,	  Perry,	  &	  Herbert,	  1996).	  	  	  In	  a	  study	  using	  the	  AIBQ	  (Miers	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  73	  subjects,	  ages	  12-­‐16),	  participants	  with	  high	  social	  anxiety	  scored	  negative	  interpretations	  as	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  and	  positive	  interpretations	  as	  less	  likely	  for	  ambiguous	  social	  situations	  than	  did	  participants	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  	  Highly	  anxious	  adolescents	  were	  also	  more	  negative	  in	  their	  beliefs	  than	  were	  non-­‐anxious	  adolescents.	  	  The	  study	  found	  that	  females	  were	  significantly	  more	  negative	  and	  less	  positive	  in	  their	  interpretations	  than	  boys	  were,	  and	  also	  had	  more	  negative	  beliefs.	  	  However,	  these	  effects	  of	  sex	  disappeared	  once	  levels	  of	  social	  anxiety	  were	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  Thus,	  the	  difference	  in	  negative	  interpretations	  and	  beliefs	  was	  possibly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  more	  girls	  than	  boys	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  	   Miers	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  did	  not	  compare	  social	  interpretation	  scores	  to	  nonsocial	  interpretation	  scores,	  so	  inferences	  about	  differences	  between	  scenario	  types	  cannot	  be	  made.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  broad	  age	  range	  was	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  	  A	  later	  study	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conducted	  by	  Lynn	  and	  colleagues	  (2012;	  47	  participants)	  sought	  to	  replicate	  the	  findings	  of	  Miers	  et	  al	  (2008)	  in	  a	  smaller	  age	  range	  (ages	  12	  to	  14),	  and	  made	  an	  additional	  comparison	  of	  scenario	  type	  by	  gender.	  	  Lynn	  and	  colleagues	  (2012)	  found	  that	  girls	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  their	  interpretations	  for	  both	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Miers	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  the	  sexes	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  scores	  for	  positive	  interpretations	  or	  mean	  beliefs.	  	  Lynn	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  also	  found	  that	  both	  sexes	  were	  more	  positive	  in	  their	  interpretations	  of	  non-­‐social	  scenarios	  than	  social,	  and	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  the	  positive	  interpretations	  for	  non-­‐social	  scenarios.	  	  Although	  girls	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  negative	  interpretations	  occur	  to	  them	  as	  explanations	  for	  either	  scenario,	  social	  phobia	  scores	  were	  positively	  correlated	  with	  negative	  interpretations	  in	  boys	  only.	  	  This	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  girls	  generally	  interpret	  all	  events	  more	  negatively	  than	  boys	  regardless	  of	  levels	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  whereas	  boys	  exhibit	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  of	  social	  events	  only	  if	  they	  have	  underlying	  social	  anxiety.	  	  	   Though	  the	  data	  is	  not	  yet	  conclusive,	  it	  appears	  that	  biases	  in	  interpretation	  differ	  for	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  ambiguous	  scenarios,	  with	  a	  more	  negative	  style	  associated	  with	  social	  scenarios.	  	  Adolescent	  females	  also	  appear	  to	  exhibit	  a	  more	  negative	  interpretation	  style	  than	  males,	  interpreting	  both	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  more	  negatively	  than	  males	  regardless	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  	  However,	  Lynn	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  is	  the	  only	  study	  to	  date	  that	  has	  investigated	  adolescent	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios,	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study	  merit	  replication.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  not	  known	  whether	  these	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  bias	  persist	  into	  young	  adulthood,	  or	  if	  the	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  diminishes	  as	  female	  adolescents	  enter	  young	  adulthood.	  	  While	  researchers	  have	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focused	  on	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  bias	  in	  adolescents	  and	  adults	  separately,	  no	  studies	  have	  measured	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  age	  groups.	  	  	  	  	  
Relationships,	  Social	  Skills,	  and	  Mood	  Disorders	  Adolescence	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  interpersonal	  relationships	  (Ingles,	  Hidalgo,	  &	  Méndez,	  2005).	  	  Family	  relationships	  are	  overshadowed	  as	  peer	  acceptance	  and	  romantic	  relationships	  take	  a	  central	  role	  (Furman	  &	  Buhrmester,	  1992).	  	  Unfortunately,	  those	  with	  social	  anxiety	  and/or	  depression	  tend	  to	  be	  rejected	  more	  often	  by	  peers,	  and	  rejection	  only	  reinforces	  mood	  disorders	  (Segrin,	  1992).	  	  In	  comorbidity	  surveys,	  non-­‐clinical	  social	  anxiety,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  clinical	  form,	  social	  phobia,	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  levels	  of	  depression	  in	  adolescents	  (Angold,	  Costello,	  Erkanli,	  &	  Worthman,	  1999).	  	  In	  fact,	  anxiety	  is	  known	  to	  precede	  and	  predict	  depression,	  and	  nearly	  50%	  of	  individuals	  with	  social	  phobia	  will	  later	  be	  diagnosed	  with	  depression	  (Beesdo	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  Therefore,	  anything	  that	  prevents	  normal	  social	  development	  in	  peer	  and	  romantic	  relationships	  during	  adolescence	  is	  a	  potential	  contributor	  to	  depression	  (Starr	  &	  Davila,	  2008).	  	  	  A	  variety	  of	  dysfunctional	  social	  behaviors	  are	  linked	  to	  depression	  and	  anxiety,	  and	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  cause/effect	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  bidirectional	  (Banerjee,	  Watling,	  &	  Caputi,	  2011;	  Davila,	  Karney,	  Hall,	  &	  Bradbury,	  2003).	  	  In	  particular,	  passivity	  in	  social	  relationships,	  such	  as	  not	  expressing	  emotion	  and	  over-­‐dependence	  on	  others,	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  interpersonal	  stress	  (Davila	  &	  Beck,	  2002).	  	  Over-­‐dependence	  on	  others	  manifests	  itself	  in	  excessive	  reassurance	  seeking,	  which	  then	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rejection	  by	  one’s	  peers	  (Joiner,	  Metalsky,	  Katz,	  &	  Beach,	  1999).	  	  Thus,	  better	  understanding	  the	  cause	  and	  nature	  of	  social	  impairment	  is	  crucial	  in	  alleviating	  the	  stress	  and	  anxiety	  felt	  by	  afflicted	  adolescents.	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Social	  problems	  in	  adolescence	  may	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  negative	  interpretation	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios.	  	  In	  particular,	  a	  negative	  social	  interpretation	  bias	  may	  interfere	  with	  normal	  social	  development	  by	  increasing	  the	  perceived	  difficulty	  of	  social	  relationships.	  	  If	  an	  adolescent	  tends	  to	  interpret	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios	  more	  negatively,	  then	  he	  or	  she	  may	  feel	  that	  social	  relationships	  are	  more	  difficult	  than	  do	  other	  adolescents.	  Difficulty	  with	  social	  relationships	  may	  lead	  individuals	  to	  avoid	  social	  situations,	  which	  may	  then	  prevent	  those	  individuals	  from	  developing	  appropriate	  social	  skills	  (Starr	  &	  Davila,	  2008).	  	  Poor	  social	  skills	  correlate	  with	  poorer	  quality	  relationships	  (Sanderson,	  DiNardo,	  Rapee,	  &	  Barlow,	  1990),	  increasing	  perceived	  difficulty	  in	  social	  relationships.	  	  Thus,	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios	  may	  create	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  where	  social	  relationships	  are	  difficult	  →	  social	  situations	  are	  avoided	  →	  social	  skills	  do	  not	  develop	  →	  thereby	  making	  relationships	  more	  difficult.	  	   Ingles	  and	  colleagues	  (2005)	  created	  a	  questionnaire	  for	  adolescents	  aged	  12-­‐18	  years,	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  levels	  of	  perceived	  difficulty	  in	  interpersonal	  relationships.	  The	  Questionnaire	  about	  Interpersonal	  Difficulties	  for	  Adolescents	  (QIDA;	  Ingles	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  presents	  scenarios	  relating	  to	  assertiveness,	  romantic	  relationships,	  public	  speaking,	  family	  relationships,	  and	  close	  friendships,	  and	  provides	  a	  Likert	  scale	  to	  measure	  the	  perceived	  difficulty	  of	  each	  scenario,	  from	  0	  (no	  difficulty)	  to	  3	  (maximum	  difficulty).	  	  For	  example,	  “complaining	  to	  a	  waiter	  when	  you	  are	  served	  bad	  food	  or	  drinks”	  might	  receive	  a	  mark	  of	  3	  (maximum	  difficulty),	  showing	  that	  the	  participant	  has	  tremendous	  difficulty	  asserting	  him	  or	  herself.	  	  	  The	  more	  difficult	  a	  person	  perceives	  social	  relationships	  and	  situations	  to	  be,	  the	  more	  anxiety	  about	  social	  relationships	  that	  person	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  feel.	  	  In	  fact,	  Ingles	  and	  colleagues	  (2005)	  found	  that	  mean	  QIDA	  scores	  (averaged	  across	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assertiveness,	  romantic	  relationships,	  public	  speaking,	  family	  relationships,	  and	  close	  friendships)	  differ	  significantly	  between	  participants	  with	  and	  without	  social	  anxiety	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  Social	  Phobia	  subscale	  of	  the	  Social	  Phobia	  and	  Anxiety	  Inventory	  (ages	  12-­‐18):	  a	  strong	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  was	  found	  between	  the	  QIDA	  total	  score	  and	  the	  Social	  Phobia	  subscale	  score	  from	  the	  Social	  Phobia	  and	  Anxiety	  Inventory.	  	  Adolescents	  with	  clinical	  social	  phobia	  also	  have	  statistically	  higher	  mean	  QIDA	  scores	  than	  do	  non-­‐anxious	  adolescents	  (Ingles	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  Therefore,	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios,	  combined	  with	  the	  subsequent	  increase	  in	  perceived	  difficulty	  of	  social	  relationships,	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  social	  anxiety	  and	  depression.	  To	  date,	  no	  research	  exists	  that	  examines	  the	  relationship	  between	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  and	  perceived	  difficulty	  of	  social	  relationships.	  	  Gender	  differences	  in	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  QIDA	  also	  have	  not	  been	  investigated,	  but	  due	  to	  apparent	  sex	  differences	  in	  social	  anxiety	  rates,	  such	  investigation	  is	  warranted.	  	  As	  adolescents	  transition	  to	  young	  adulthood,	  the	  level	  of	  difficulty	  associated	  with	  interpersonal	  relationships	  may	  change,	  so	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  in	  young	  adults	  also	  deserves	  research	  attention.	  	  More	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  interpersonal	  relationships	  and	  how	  they	  are	  perceived,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  sex	  and	  age	  differences	  exist.	  	  
Negative	  Interpretation	  Bias,	  Interpersonal	  Difficulty,	  and	  Mood	  Disorders:	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  present	  study	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationships	  between	  sex,	  age,	  mood	  disorder	  symptomology,	  negative	  social	  interpretation	  bias,	  and	  perceived	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  in	  adolescents	  and	  young	  adults.	  	  To	  investigate	  the	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretations	  and	  beliefs	  of	  ambiguous	  events,	  we	  took	  measures	  of	  the	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AIBQ	  in	  a	  British	  adolescent	  population.	  	  Given	  that	  sex	  differences	  in	  mood	  disorders	  appear	  in	  early	  to	  mid-­‐adolescence	  (Kessler	  et	  al.,	  1994),	  we	  chose	  to	  limit	  our	  population	  to	  adolescents	  aged	  approximately	  12-­‐14.	  	  Because	  we	  do	  not	  know	  how	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  bias	  change	  from	  adolescence	  to	  adulthood,	  we	  included	  a	  young-­‐adult	  cohort	  in	  the	  study	  as	  a	  comparison	  group	  (ages	  22-­‐25).	  	  	  The	  adolescent	  cohort	  is	  hypothesized	  to	  exhibit	  the	  same	  gender	  patterns	  as	  found	  in	  the	  studies	  by	  Miers	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  and	  Lynn	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  with	  females	  exhibiting	  a	  greater	  negative	  social	  interpretation	  bias	  than	  their	  male	  counterparts.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  we	  expect	  that	  the	  female	  adolescents	  will	  have	  more	  negative	  and	  less	  positive	  interpretations	  come	  to	  mind	  for	  ambiguous	  social	  events,	  and	  that	  female	  adolescents	  will	  be	  more	  negative	  on	  average	  in	  their	  beliefs	  than	  will	  male	  adolescents.	  	  Given	  that	  neither	  (Amir	  et	  al.,	  1998)	  nor	  (Constans,	  Penn,	  Ihen,	  &	  Hope,	  1999)	  found	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  bias	  of	  social	  scenarios	  (albeit	  using	  a	  different	  ambiguous	  scenarios	  questionnaire),	  we	  do	  not	  expect	  to	  find	  a	  sex	  difference	  in	  interpretation	  in	  the	  adult	  population.	  	  In	  addition,	  to	  investigate	  both	  sex	  and	  age	  differences	  in	  perceived	  level	  of	  interpersonal	  difficulty,	  we	  also	  included	  the	  Questionnaire	  about	  Interpersonal	  Difficulties	  for	  Adolescents	  (QIDA;	  Ingles	  et	  al.	  2005).	  	  We	  also	  would	  like	  to	  see	  if	  a	  tendency	  to	  negatively	  interpret	  ambiguous	  social	  events	  positively	  correlates	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  interpersonal	  difficulty.	  Because	  levels	  of	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  can	  affect	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ambiguous	  scenarios	  are	  interpreted	  and	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  perceived,	  the	  Revised	  Children’s	  Anxiety	  and	  Depression	  Scales	  (RCADS;	  Chorpita,	  Yim,	  Moffitt,	  Umemoto,	  &	  Francis,	  2000)	  and	  the	  Depression,	  Anxiety,	  and	  Stress	  Scales	  (DASS;	  Lovibond	  &	  Lovibond	  1995)	  were	  included	  in	  the	  study	  to	  control	  for	  mood	  in	  the	  adolescents	  and	  adults	  respectively.	  	  Females	  tend	  to	  have	  higher	  verbal	  fluency	  than	  males	  of	  the	  same	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age	  (Hyde	  &	  Linn,	  1988),	  and	  so	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  differences	  in	  responses	  were	  not	  due	  to	  impairments	  in	  understanding,	  we	  included	  a	  measure	  of	  receptive	  vocabulary	  for	  adolescents	  (British	  Picture	  Vocabulary	  Scale,	  BPVS;	  Dunn,	  Dunn,	  &	  Whetton,	  1997)	  and	  adults	  (National	  Adult	  Reading	  Test,	  NART;	  	  Nelson,	  1982).	  	  We	  anticipate	  a	  correlation	  between	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  and	  levels	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  depression	  in	  adolescents	  and	  depression	  in	  adults.	  	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  current	  study	  were:	  1	  a)	  adolescent	  females	  will	  be	  more	  negative	  and	  b)	  less	  positive	  than	  adolescent	  males	  in	  their	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events;	  2)	  adolescent	  females	  will	  have	  a	  more	  negative	  mean	  belief	  score	  than	  males;	  3)	  adults	  will	  show	  no	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretation;	  4	  a)	  adolescents	  will	  be	  more	  negative	  and	  b)	  less	  positive	  than	  adults	  in	  social	  interpretations,	  and	  c)	  will	  have	  more	  negative	  social	  beliefs;	  5	  a)	  adolescents	  will	  have	  more	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  than	  adults,	  b)	  female	  adolescents	  will	  have	  more	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  than	  male	  adolescents,	  and	  c)	  adults	  will	  have	  no	  sex	  differences,	  6)	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios	  will	  positively	  correlate	  with	  perceived	  difficulty	  in	  interpersonal	  relationships,	  and	  7)	  social	  phobia	  scores	  in	  adolescents	  will	  correlate	  positively	  with	  a)	  perceived	  level	  of	  interpersonal	  difficulty,	  	  b)	  negative	  social	  interpretation	  scores,	  but	  not	  c)	  negative	  non-­‐social	  interpretation	  scores,	  and	  that	  d)	  symptoms	  of	  depression	  may	  affect	  the	  correlations.	  
	  
METHOD	  
Participants	  and	  Recruitment	  All	  participants	  were	  self-­‐selected	  volunteers.	  	  The	  adolescent	  cohort	  was	  recruited	  from	  the	  local	  Fife	  County,	  UK	  population,	  and	  the	  adult	  cohort	  was	  recruited	  through	  the	  postgraduate	  community	  at	  the	  University	  of	  St	  Andrews.	  	  Advertisements	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for	  participant	  recruitment	  were	  placed	  in	  local	  community	  centres,	  sports	  centres,	  theatre	  groups,	  youth	  groups,	  supermarkets,	  St	  Andrews	  department	  bulletin	  boards,	  staff	  and	  student	  memos,	  and	  also	  in	  a	  community	  centre	  in	  Cupar,	  Scotland.	  
A	  total	  of	  20	  adolescents	  participated,	  with	  9	  females	  (M	  =	  14.0,	  SD	  =	  1.0,	  range	  =	  12.2	  –	  15.2	  years	  old)	  and	  11	  males	  (M	  =	  13.3,	  SD	  =	  0.3,	  range	  =	  12.2	  –	  15.5	  years	  old).	  	  A	  total	  of	  20	  adults	  participated,	  with	  10	  females	  (M	  =	  	  24.0,	  SD	  =	  0.7,	  range	  =	  22.9	  –	  25.1	  years	  old)	  and	  10	  males	  (M	  =	  23.8,	  SD	  =	  1.0,	  range	  =	  22.8	  –	  25.5	  years	  old).	  	  Nine	  adolescent	  participants	  in	  total	  were	  recruited	  from	  Madras	  College.	  	  Eleven	  adolescent	  participants	  and	  twenty	  adult	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  outside	  school	  through	  the	  various	  advertisements	  specified.	  	  The	  small	  number	  of	  adolescents	  who	  volunteered	  for	  participation	  was	  not	  expected;	  previous	  research	  projects	  involving	  adolescents	  from	  the	  St	  Andrews	  area	  successfully	  recruited	  larger	  numbers.	  	  However,	  all	  adolescent	  participants	  were	  of	  British	  nationality	  from	  Fife	  County,	  Scotland,	  and	  so	  no	  differences	  in	  language,	  culture,	  or	  nationality	  are	  expected.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  adult	  cohort	  is	  of	  various	  languages,	  cultures,	  and	  nationalities,	  and	  therefore	  data	  must	  be	  considered	  with	  these	  differences	  in	  mind.	  
Procedure	  
Madras	  students	  were	  tested	  in	  a	  private	  room	  at	  Madras	  campus	  during	  the	  school	  day,	  and	  were	  seen	  individually	  during	  a	  50-­‐minute	  class	  period.	  	  	  Staff	  children	  and	  all	  adult	  participants	  were	  interviewed	  in	  a	  private	  room	  allocated	  in	  the	  School	  of	  Psychology	  building	  at	  the	  University	  of	  St	  Andrews,	  and	  were	  reimbursed	  £5	  for	  their	  time.	  	  A	  parent	  or	  guardian	  gave	  written	  consent	  for	  all	  adolescents,	  and	  verbal	  assent	  was	  obtained	  from	  each	  adolescent	  prior	  to	  the	  testing	  session.	  	  All	  adults	  provided	  written	  consent.	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Using	  an	  online	  random	  number	  generator	  (www.randomizer.org/form.htm),	  forty	  4-­‐digit	  numbers	  were	  generated	  and	  assigned	  to	  each	  participant.	  	  This	  number	  was	  printed	  in	  grey	  ink	  at	  the	  bottom-­‐left	  corner	  of	  each	  questionnaire	  sheet,	  and	  was	  also	  printed	  on	  the	  debrief	  sheet	  to	  provide	  participants	  the	  opportunity	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  study	  after	  completion.	  	  The	  order	  of	  the	  questionnaires	  was	  uniformly	  maintained	  for	  each	  participant.	  	  Adolescents	  completed	  the	  Adolescent	  Interpretation	  Bias	  Questionnaire	  (AIBQ),	  Questionnaire	  on	  Interpersonal	  Difficulties	  for	  Adolescents	  (QIDA),	  Revised	  Child	  Anxiety	  and	  Depression	  Scales	  (RCADS),	  sex	  and	  age	  sheet,	  and	  British	  Picture	  Vocabulary	  Scale	  (BPVS)	  in	  succession.	  	  Adults	  completed	  the	  AIBQ,	  QIDA,	  Depression,	  Anxiety,	  and	  Stress	  Scales	  (DASS),	  sex	  and	  age	  sheet,	  and	  the	  National	  Adult	  Reading	  Test	  (NART).	  	  The	  AIBQ	  was	  completed	  first	  by	  all	  participants	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  priming	  an	  interpretation	  bias.	  	  To	  avoid	  influencing	  participant	  responses,	  the	  researcher	  answered	  all	  participant	  questions	  about	  the	  study	  carefully,	  and	  all	  participants	  were	  fully	  debriefed	  upon	  completion.	  	  Testing	  sessions	  took	  between	  35	  and	  45	  minutes	  to	  complete.	  
	  
Measures	  1. British	  Vocabulary	  Picture	  Scale-­III	  (BPVS;	  Dunn,	  Dunn,	  &	  Whetton,	  1997):	  	  The	  BPVS	  measures	  receptive	  vocabulary	  age	  in	  English-­‐speaking	  children	  and	  adolescents	  ages	  3-­‐16	  years.	  The	  participant	  is	  shown	  a	  series	  of	  four	  pictures	  and	  must	  decide	  which	  picture	  best	  represents	  a	  given	  word.	  	  The	  experimenter	  begins	  with	  the	  appropriate	  level	  for	  the	  participant’s	  age,	  and	  progresses	  through	  each	  set	  of	  twelve	  words	  until	  the	  participant	  gets	  eight	  or	  more	  words	  wrong	  or	  has	  completed	  the	  last	  level.	  	  Receptive	  vocabulary	  age	  is	  then	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calculated	  in	  years	  and	  months	  for	  each	  participant.	  	  The	  test	  has	  high	  validity,	  and	  has	  exhibited	  good	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  scores	  (Dunn	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  	  2. National	  Adult	  Reading	  Test	  (NART;	  Nelson,	  1982;	  Appendix	  A):	  The	  NART	  estimates	  verbal	  intelligence	  in	  adult	  English	  speakers.	  	  The	  test	  comprises	  50	  English	  words	  with	  an	  irregular	  pronunciation	  (e.g.,	  depot).	  	  The	  participant	  reads	  the	  words	  aloud	  one	  by	  one,	  and	  is	  graded	  on	  accuracy	  of	  pronunciation.	  	  A	  score	  of	  1	  indicates	  a	  correct	  pronunciation	  and	  a	  score	  of	  0	  indicates	  an	  incorrect	  pronunciation.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  test,	  the	  scores	  are	  summed	  to	  give	  a	  raw	  score	  out	  of	  50.	  	  The	  NART	  has	  high	  reliability	  and	  is	  a	  good	  verbal	  predictor	  of	  IQ	  in	  the	  general	  population	  (Crawford,	  1989).	  	  3. Revised	  Child	  Anxiety	  and	  Depression	  Scale	  (RCADS;	  Chorpita,	  Yim,	  Moffitt,	  
Umemoto,	  &	  Francis,	  2000;	  Appendix	  B):	  The	  RCADS	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  separation	  anxiety,	  generalized	  anxiety,	  panic,	  social	  phobia,	  obsessions/compulsions,	  and	  depression	  in	  children	  and	  adolescents	  aged	  6	  -­‐	  18.	  	  The	  questionnaire	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  fixed	  random	  order,	  and	  has	  47	  items	  in	  which	  the	  participant	  must	  state	  how	  often	  the	  item	  (e.g.,	  “I	  get	  scared	  when	  I	  have	  to	  take	  a	  test”)	  applies	  to	  them	  on	  a	  four-­‐point	  Likert	  scale	  (0	  =	  never,	  1	  =	  sometimes,	  2	  =	  often,	  and	  3	  =	  always).	  	  A	  raw	  score	  for	  each	  dimension	  is	  calculated	  by	  summing	  participant	  responses.	  	  The	  individual	  scales	  are	  also	  compiled	  into	  a	  total	  anxiety	  score	  and	  a	  total	  anxiety	  and	  depression	  score.	  	  The	  scale	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  clinical	  diagnostic	  tool,	  but	  rather	  is	  used	  to	  assess	  symptomology.	  	  Test-­‐retest	  validity	  as	  well	  as	  internal	  validity	  is	  good,	  with	  high	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  scores	  (Chorpita	  et	  al.,	  2000).	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  4. Depression	  Anxiety	  and	  Stress	  Scales	  (DASS;	  Lovibond	  &	  Lovibond	  1995;	  Appendix	  
C):	  The	  DASS	  is	  a	  self-­‐report	  questionnaire	  designed	  to	  measure	  levels	  of	  stress,	  anxiety,	  and	  depression	  in	  adults	  over	  the	  period	  of	  one	  week.	  	  There	  are	  14	  questions	  each	  about	  stress,	  anxiety,	  and	  depression,	  with	  42	  questions	  overall.	  	  Participants	  are	  asked	  to	  consider	  on	  a	  4-­‐point	  Likert	  scale	  how	  often	  he	  or	  she	  experienced	  a	  particular	  symptom	  over	  the	  course	  of	  one	  week,	  with	  0	  being	  “did	  not	  apply	  to	  me	  at	  all”	  to	  3	  “applied	  to	  me	  very	  much,	  or	  most	  of	  the	  time.”	  	  Summing	  the	  scores	  across	  each	  subscale	  gives	  the	  respective	  depression,	  anxiety,	  and	  stress	  score.	  	  Internal	  consistencies	  for	  each	  scale	  of	  the	  DASS	  were	  good	  (Lovibond	  &	  Lovibond,	  1995).	  	  5. Adolescent’s	  Interpretation	  and	  Belief	  Questionnaire	  (AIBQ;	  Miers,	  Blote,	  Bogels,	  &	  
Westenberg,	  2008;	  Appendix	  D):	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  AIBQ	  is	  to	  measure	  interpretation	  bias	  in	  children	  and	  adolescents	  ages	  12-­‐18.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  questionnaire	  gauges	  an	  individual’s	  tendency	  to	  interpret	  ambiguous	  social	  and	  non-­‐social	  situations	  in	  positive,	  negative,	  or	  neutral	  ways.	  	  The	  AIBQ	  presents	  ten	  ambiguous,	  ordinary	  situations,	  five	  social	  and	  five	  non-­‐social,	  and	  asks	  the	  participant	  to	  imagine	  him-­‐	  or	  herself	  in	  that	  situation.	  The	  example	  scenario	  is	  
“A	  few	  weeks	  after	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  new	  school	  year,	  your	  teacher	  (mentor)	  
asks	  to	  speak	  to	  you.	  	  Why	  does	  he	  or	  she	  want	  to	  speak	  to	  you?”	  	  For	  each	  scenario,	  three	  different	  potential	  explanations	  are	  provided,	  one	  positive	  (He	  or	  
she	  wants	  to	  tell	  me	  that	  they	  are	  very	  satisfied	  with	  my	  work),	  negative	  (He	  or	  she	  
expected	  much	  better	  work	  from	  me	  and	  thinks	  that	  I	  need	  to	  work	  harder),	  and	  neutral	  (He	  or	  she	  might	  want	  to	  ask	  me	  something).	  	  The	  participant	  is	  asked	  to	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rate	  how	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  each	  explanation	  would	  occur	  to	  them	  on	  a	  5-­‐point	  Likert	  scale,	  with	  1	  =	  does	  not	  pop	  up	  in	  my	  mind,	  3	  =	  might	  pop	  up	  in	  my	  mind,	  and	  5	  =	  definitely	  pops	  up	  in	  my	  mind.	  	  The	  participant	  is	  then	  asked	  to	  mark	  the	  explanation	  that,	  upon	  further	  reflection,	  he	  or	  she	  believes	  is	  the	  most	  likely	  explanation.	  	  Social	  and	  non-­‐social	  events	  are	  presented	  in	  a	  fixed	  random	  order,	  and	  participants	  are	  not	  told	  that	  there	  are	  two	  different	  types	  of	  scenarios	  in	  consideration,	  so	  as	  to	  not	  influence	  the	  participant	  responses.	  	  Mean	  interpretation	  scores	  are	  calculated	  by	  summing	  the	  ratings	  given	  for	  positive,	  negative,	  and	  neutral	  explanations	  for	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  events	  separately	  and	  then	  dividing	  by	  five.	  	  This	  yields	  a	  total	  of	  six	  interpretation	  scores	  (one	  positive,	  one	  negative,	  and	  one	  neutral	  for	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  each)	  with	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  scores	  from	  1	  to	  5	  for	  each.	  	  Belief	  scores	  are	  calculated	  by	  assigning	  a	  value	  to	  the	  marked	  explanation,	  with	  negative	  =	  1,	  neutral	  =	  2,	  and	  positive	  =	  3.	  	  Social	  and	  non-­‐social	  scenarios	  were	  summed	  separately	  and	  then	  divided	  by	  five	  to	  give	  a	  Mean	  belief	  score	  for	  the	  two	  dimensions.	  	  In	  total,	  six	  interpretation	  scores	  and	  two	  belief	  scores	  results	  in	  a	  total	  of	  eight	  scores	  per	  participant.	  	  6. Questionnaire	  about	  Interpersonal	  Difficulties	  in	  Adolescents	  (QIDA;	  Inglés,	  
Méndez,	  &	  Hidalgo,	  2000;	  Appendix	  E):	  The	  QIDA	  is	  a	  self-­‐	  report	  measure	  validated	  for	  use	  in	  children	  and	  adolescents	  ages	  12-­‐18,	  and	  assesses	  the	  participant’s	  perceived	  difficulty	  with	  interpersonal	  relationships.	  The	  QIDA	  presents	  36	  scenarios	  in	  a	  fixed,	  random	  order	  relating	  to	  assertiveness,	  romantic	  relationships,	  public	  speaking,	  family	  relationships,	  and	  close	  friendships.	  	  The	  participant	  is	  asked	  to	  consider	  each	  scenario	  and	  rank	  the	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difficulty	  on	  a	  5-­‐point	  Likert	  scale,	  from	  0	  =	  no	  difficulty	  to	  4	  =	  maximum	  difficulty.	  	  The	  original	  QIDA	  has	  separate	  forms	  for	  boys	  and	  girls	  to	  allow	  the	  romantic	  relationship	  situations	  to	  be	  heterosexually	  relevant.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  scenario	  “starting	  a	  conversation	  with	  a	  girl	  your	  own	  age	  you	  don’t	  know	  at	  the	  
bus	  stop”	  was	  used	  for	  boys,	  and	  the	  word	  “girl”	  was	  replaced	  with	  “boy”	  on	  the	  girl	  version.	  To	  avoid	  problems	  with	  participant	  sexuality,	  the	  same	  version	  of	  the	  QIDA	  was	  used	  for	  all	  participants	  by	  changing	  the	  above	  scenario	  and	  all	  other	  similar	  scenarios	  to:	  “starting	  a	  conversation	  with	  a	  person	  your	  age	  you	  
don’t	  know	  but	  may	  fancy	  at	  the	  bus	  stop.”	  	  Average	  scores	  were	  calculated	  across	  the	  five	  dimensions	  (Assertiveness,	  Romantic	  Relationships,	  Public	  Speaking,	  Family	  Relationships,	  Close	  Relationships)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  sixth	  average	  total	  QIDA	  score	  found	  by	  summing	  the	  five	  dimension	  scores	  and	  dividing	  by	  5.	  	  Excellent	  internal	  consistency,	  acceptable	  test-­‐retest	  reliability,	  and	  good	  validity	  have	  been	  found	  for	  this	  measure	  (Bogdan,	  Szentagotai,	  Dobrean,	  and	  David,	  2012).	  	  	  	  
Ethical	  Approval	  and	  Timeline	  
Various	  committees	  and	  organisations	  gave	  approval	  to	  conduct	  the	  research	  project.	  To	  work	  with	  underage	  children,	  membership	  to	  the	  Protecting	  Vulnerable	  Groups	  scheme	  was	  obtained	  from	  Disclosure	  Scotland.	  	  The	  application	  was	  submitted	  on	  4/11/2011,	  and	  membership	  was	  issued	  on	  22/11/2011.	  Ethical	  approval	  to	  conduct	  the	  project	  from	  the	  University	  of	  St.	  Andrews,	  School	  of	  Psychology	  Ethical	  Committee	  was	  applied	  for	  on	  28/11/2011	  and	  was	  granted	  19/1/2012,	  Ethics	  Reference	  Number:	  PS8341.	  On	  21/12/2011,	  the	  researcher	  met	  with	  an	  educational	  psychologist	  to	  discuss	  working	  with	  children	  in	  schools.	  Approval	  to	  conduct	  the	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research	  from	  the	  Local	  Education	  Authority	  of	  Fife	  County,	  Scotland	  was	  applied	  for	  on	  26/1/2012	  and	  was	  granted	  16/2/2012.	  Amendments	  to	  the	  project	  were	  approved	  by	  the	  School	  of	  Psychology	  Ethics	  Committee	  29/5/2012	  and	  2/6/2012.	  	  
Statistical	  Analyses	  All	  data	  was	  analysed	  using	  SPSS19,	  with	  an	  alpha	  level	  of	  α	  =	  .05.	  	  Sidak’s	  adjustment	  of	  power	  was	  used	  for	  post-­‐hoc	  pairwise	  comparisons	  of	  significant	  results	  in	  the	  ANOVAs.	  	  Partial	  eta	  squared	  values	  were	  used	  to	  estimate	  effect	  sizes.	  	  Values	  of	  .01,	  .06,	  .14	  were	  interpreted	  as	  being	  small,	  medium,	  and	  large	  respectively.	  
1)	  Age,	  receptive	  vocabulary,	  and	  anxiety/depression	  scales.	  	  	   For	  the	  adolescent	  and	  young	  adult	  participants,	  independent	  samples	  t-­‐tests	  were	  used	  to	  examine	  whether	  males	  and	  females	  differed	  in	  mean	  age	  within	  each	  age	  group.	  Independent	  samples	  t-­‐tests	  were	  also	  used	  to	  examine	  whether	  males	  and	  females	  differed	  in	  receptive	  vocabulary	  within	  each	  age	  group	  (BPVS	  and	  NART	  data).	  	  A	  MANOVA	  was	  run	  on	  the	  adolescents	  with	  depression,	  generalized	  anxiety,	  and	  social	  anxiety	  scores	  from	  the	  RCADS	  as	  variables	  and	  sex	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  variable.	  	  A	  separate	  MANOVA	  was	  run	  on	  the	  adults	  with	  depression,	  anxiety,	  and	  stress	  scores	  from	  the	  DASS	  as	  variables	  and	  sex	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  variable.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  general	  analysis,	  the	  adult	  and	  adolescents	  were	  considered	  as	  one	  population.	  	  Neutral	  interpretation	  scores	  from	  the	  AIBQ	  were	  excluded	  from	  analysis,	  following	  the	  analysis	  method	  used	  by	  Miers	  et	  al.	  2008	  and	  Lynn	  et	  al.	  2012.	  	  	  	  
2)	  AIBQ:	  Mean	  Negative	  Interpretations	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To	  test	  Hypotheses	  1a,	  3,	  and	  4a,	  the	  first	  AIBQ	  mean	  interpretations	  analysis	  compares	  negative	  interpretation	  scores	  between	  scenario	  types,	  sexes,	  and	  age	  groups.	  	  	  Social	  and	  nonsocial	  negative	  interpretation	  scores	  were	  analysed	  using	  a	  Repeated	  Measures	  ANOVA,	  with	  scenario	  (social	  and	  nonsocial)	  run	  as	  a	  within-­‐subject	  variable	  and	  sex	  and	  age	  group	  run	  as	  between-­‐subject	  variables.	  	  	  Post-­‐hoc	  simple	  effects	  tests	  with	  Sidak’s	  adjustments	  were	  run	  to	  explore	  pairwise	  comparisons.	  	  Unfortunately,	  as	  different	  scales	  were	  used	  to	  measure	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  the	  adolescent	  and	  adult	  populations,	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  could	  not	  be	  controlled	  for	  as	  covariates.	  	  Instead,	  bivariate	  correlations	  were	  run	  (as	  described	  in	  section	  6)	  in	  the	  adolescent	  cohort	  to	  test	  for	  correlations	  between	  social	  phobia,	  interpersonal	  difficulties,	  and	  interpretation	  scores.	  	  As	  adolescents	  were	  our	  main	  focus	  of	  investigation,	  and	  to	  increase	  the	  power	  of	  our	  tests,	  we	  chose	  to	  examine	  the	  relationships	  in	  adolescents	  only.	  	  
3)	  AIBQ:	  Mean	  Positive	  Interpretations	  Mean	  positive	  interpretation	  scores	  were	  compared	  between	  scenario	  types,	  sexes,	  and	  age	  groups	  to	  test	  Hypotheses	  1b,	  3,	  and	  4b.	  	  Interpretation	  scores	  were	  analysed	  using	  a	  Repeated	  Measures	  ANOVA,	  with	  scenario	  (social	  and	  nonsocial)	  and	  valence	  (positive	  and	  negative)	  run	  as	  within-­‐subject	  variables	  and	  sex	  and	  age	  group	  run	  as	  between-­‐subject	  variables.	  	  Simple	  effects	  tests	  with	  Sidak’s	  adjustments	  were	  run	  to	  explore	  pairwise	  comparisons.	  	  
4)	  AIBQ:	  Mean	  Beliefs	  To	  test	  Hypotheses	  2,	  3,	  and	  4c,	  mean	  belief	  scores	  were	  compared	  between	  scenario	  types,	  sexes,	  and	  age	  groups	  using	  a	  Repeated	  Measure	  ANOVA.	  	  Scenario	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(social	  and	  nonsocial)	  was	  run	  as	  a	  within-­‐subject	  variable,	  and	  sex	  and	  age	  group	  were	  run	  as	  between-­‐subjects	  variables.	  	  	  	  
5)	  QIDA	  scores	  Mean	  QIDA	  scores	  for	  the	  five	  factors	  (assertiveness,	  romantic	  relationships,	  public	  speaking,	  family	  relationships,	  and	  close	  friendships)	  were	  analysed	  to	  test	  Hypotheses	  5a,	  b,	  and	  c,	  by	  using	  a	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA,	  with	  mean	  QIDA	  scores	  as	  within-­‐subject	  variables	  and	  sex	  and	  age	  group	  as	  between	  subject-­‐variables.	  	  	  	  	  
6)	  Bivariate	  Correlations	  
Mean	  Negative	  Social	  Interpretations	  and	  Mean	  Total	  QIDA	  Score:	  	  To	  test	  Hypothesis	  6,	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  bivariate	  correlation	  was	  run	  on	  all	  forty	  participants	  to	  assess	  the	  relationship	  between	  mean	  negative	  social	  interpretations	  and	  mean	  total	  QIDA	  score.	  	  
	  
Social	  Phobia	  and	  Mean	  Total	  QIDA	  Score:	  	  Hypothesis	  7a)	  was	  tested	  by	  running	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  bivariate	  correlation	  on	  the	  adolescent	  participants	  to	  detect	  correlations	  between	  social	  phobia	  scores	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  RCADS	  and	  interpersonal	  difficulty	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  QIDA.	  	  
Social	  Phobia	  and	  AIBQ	  Mean	  Interpretation	  Scores:	  To	  test	  hypotheses	  7b	  and	  c,	  four,	  two-­‐tailed	  bivariate	  correlation	  analyses	  were	  run	  on	  the	  adolescent	  data	  to	  assess	  the	  relationships	  between	  social	  phobia	  scores	  and	  AIBQ	  interpretation	  scores	  (positive	  and	  negative,	  social	  and	  nonsocial)	  in	  adolescents.	  	  Alpha-­‐level	  was	  adjusted	  by	  dividing	  by	  four,	  such	  that	  α	  <	  .0125	  was	  considered	  significant.	  	  To	  test	  Hypothesis	  7d),	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correlations	  were	  re-­‐run	  including	  depression	  scores	  as	  a	  covariate	  for	  the	  tests	  that	  reached	  significance.	  
	  
RESULTS	  
1a)	  Age	  (Table	  1)	  There	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  mean	  ages	  in	  the	  adolescent	  group	  for	  males	  (M=13.28,	  SD=	  .34)	  and	  females	  (M=13.98,	  SD=	  .95;	  t(18)=-­‐1.45,	  p	  =	  .163,),	  or	  in	  the	  adult	  group	  between	  males	  (M=23.83,	  SD=.97)	  and	  females	  (M=24.05,	  SD=.73;	  t(18)	  =	  -­‐.59,	  p	  =	  .564).	  	  Table	  1,	  Mean	  Ages:	  	   Males	   Females	  Adolescents	   13.3	  ±	  1.1	   14.0	  ±	  .9	  Adults	   23.8	  ±	  1.0	   24.1	  ±	  .7	  	  
1b)	  Verbal	  Tests	  (Table	  2)	  
Adolescents:	  BPVS	  Levene’s	  test	  for	  equality	  of	  variances	  was	  not	  satisfied	  (p	  =	  .04).	  	  Equal	  variances	  not	  assumed,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  BPVS	  age	  equivalency	  scores	  for	  males	  (M	  =13.894,	  SD	  =	  	  2.395)	  and	  females	  (M	  =	  14.426,	  SD	  =	  1.583);	  t(17.348)	  =	  -­‐.595,	  p	  =	  .56.	  	  
Adults:	  NART	  There	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  NART	  scores	  for	  males	  (M	  =	  37.5,	  SD	  =	  8.396),	  and	  females	  (M	  =	  32.3,	  SD	  =	  5.293;	  t(18)	  =	  1.657,	  p	  =	  .115).	  	  Table	  2,	  Verbal	  Tests:	  	   	   Males	   Females	  Adolescents	   BPVS:	  Receptive	  Vocabulary	  Age	  (Years)	   13.9	  ±	  2.9	   14.4	  ±	  1.6	  Adults	   NART:	  Verbal	  Fluency	  Scores	   37.5	  ±	  8.4	   32.3	  ±	  5.3	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1c)	  Mood	  Disorder	  Symptom	  Indices	  (Table	  3)	  
Adolescents:	  RCADS	  There	   was	   a	   significant	   effect	   of	   sex	   in	   the	   adolescent	   population	   on	   social	  phobia,	  F(1,18)	  =	  5.133,	  p	  =	  .036,	  with	  females	  scoring	  as	  more	  socially	  anxious	  than	  males.	  	  Sex	  differences	  in	  depression	  and	  generalized	  anxiety	  scores	  did	  not	  reach	  significance:	  F(1,18)	  =	  2.132,	  p	  =	  .161,	  and	  F(1,18)	  =	  .045,	  p	  =	  .834.	  
	  
Adults:	  DASS	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  sex	  differences	  in	  the	  adult	  population	  in	  stress,	  anxiety,	  or	  depression	  scores:	  F(1,18)	  =	  .038,	  p	  =	  .848,	  F(1,18)	  =	  .222,	  p	  =	  .643,	  F(1,18)	  =	  .153,	  p	  =	  .700	  respectively.	  	  Table	  3,	  Mood	  Disorder	  Symptom	  Indexes:	  	   	   Males	   Females	  Adolescents	   RCADS:	  Social	  Anxiety	   11.9	  ±	  4.1	   16.7	  ±	  5.3★	  	   RCADS:	  Depression	   9.5	  ±	  3.5	   9.9	  ±	  5.6	  	   RCADS:	  Generalized	  Anxiety	   6.4	  ±	  3.1	   8.6	  ±	  3.6	  Adults	   DASS:	  Stress	   14.2	  ±	  7.4	   14.9	  ±	  8.7	  	   DASS:	  Anxiety	   8.3	  ±	  7.7	   6.9	  ±	  8.3	  	   DASS:	  Depression	   10.4	  ±	  10.6	   8.2	  ±	  10.2	  
★	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  sex	  (p	  <	  .05)	  
	  
2)	  AIBQ:	  Mean	  Negative	  Interpretations	  (Table	  4)	  The	   first	   analysis	   compared	   negative	   interpretation	   scores	   between	   scenario	  types,	  sexes,	  and	  age	  groups.	  A	  graphical	  representation	  of	  the	  negative	  scores	  reveals	  that	   females	   scored	   negative	   interpretations	   of	   both	   social	   and	   nonsocial	   scenarios	  higher	  than	  did	  their	  male	  counterparts,	  indicating	  that	  females	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  their	   interpretations	  overall,	   regardless	  of	  scenario	   type	  or	  age	  group	  (Figure	  1;	  main	  effect	  of	  sex:	  F(1,36)	  =	  6.631,	  p	  =	  0.014,	  ηp2	  =	  .156;	  main	  effect	  of	  scenario	  type:	  F(1,36)	  =	   .427,	   p	   =	   0.517,	   ηp2	   =	   .012	   and	   age	   group:	   F(1,36)	   =	   4.124,	   p	   =	   0.050,	   ηp2	   =	   .103).	  	  Although	  this	  difference	  appeared	  to	  be	  greater	  for	  social	  scenarios	  than	  for	  nonsocial	  scenarios	   (Figure	   1a),	   this	   difference	   failed	   to	   reach	   significance	   in	   the	   ANOVA	   (no	  interaction	  between	  sex	  and	  scenario	  type:	  F(1,36)	  =	  2.295,	  p	  =	  .139,	  ηp2	  =	  .06).	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Figures	  1	  and	  1a:	  
	  
	  Graphing	  the	  data	  by	  age	  group	  showed	  that	  the	  negative	  interpretation	  scores	  varied	   by	   age	   group	   and	   scenario	   (Figure	   2:	   age	   group	   by	   scenario	   interaction	   was	  significant	  in	  the	  ANOVA	  F(1,36)	  =	  8.147,	  p	  =	  .007,	  ηp2	  =.185).	  Pairwise	  comparisons	  of	  social	   interpretation	   scores	   showed	   that	   adolescents	   scored	   negative	   social	  interpretations	  as	  more	   likely	   to	  come	  to	  mind	  than	  did	  adults	   	   (F(1,36)	  =	   	  8.678,	  p	  =	  
	   35	  
.006,	  ηp2	  =	   .194).	   	  Pairwise	  comparisons	  also	  showed	  that	  adolescents	  scored	  negative	  interpretations	  as	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  for	  social	  than	  for	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  (F(1,36)	  =	  6.123,	  p	  =	  .018,	  ηp2	  =	  .145).	  Figure	  2:	  
	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  age	  tended	  towards	  significance;	  F(1,36)	  =	  4.124,	  p	  =	  .050,	  ηp2	  =	   .103),	   indicating	   that	   adolescents	   may	   have	   been	   more	   negative	   in	   their	  interpretations	  overall.	  The	  three-­‐way	  interaction	  between	  age	  group,	  scenario,	  and	  sex	  did	  not	  reach	  significance:	  F(1,36)	  =	  .006,	  p	  =	  .937,	  ηp2	  =	  .000.	  	  	  	  Table	  4;	  Mean	  Negative	  Interpretation	  Scores	  	   Males	   Females	   Adults	   Adolescents	  Overall	   2.6	  ±	  .4	   2.9	  ±	  .6★	   2.7	  ±	  .5	   2.9	  ±	  .5	  Social	   2.6	  ±	  .6	   3.1	  ±	  .8	   2.5	  ±	  .7	   3.1	  ±	  .7✚	  	  Nonsocial	   2.6	  ±	  .5	   2.9	  ±	  .5	   2.7	  ±	  .5	   2.8	  ±	  .5	  
★	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  sex	  (p	  <	  .05)	  
✚	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  scenario	  type	  (p	  <	  .05)	  
	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  age	  group	  (p	  <	  .05)	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3)	  AIBQ:	  Mean	  Positive	  Interpretations	  (Table	  5)	  The	  second	  analysis	  of	  AIBQ	  scores	  considers	  ratings	  of	  positive	  interpretations	  between	  scenario	  types,	  sexes,	  and	  age	  groups.	  	  When	  the	  positive	  ratings	  given	  for	  each	  scenario	  type	  were	  split	  by	  age	  group,	  adolescents	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  difference	  in	  mean	  ratings	  of	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  Results	  from	  the	  ANOVA	  confirmed	  that	  age	  interacted	  significantly	  with	  scenario	  (Figure	  3;	  F(1,36)	  =	  9.657,	  p	  =	  .004,	  ηp2	  	  =	  .212).	  	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  scenario	  type,	  pairwise	  comparisons	  showed	  that	  adolescents	  scored	  positive	  interpretations	  of	  nonsocial	  events	  as	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  than	  for	  social	  events	  (F(1,36)	  =	  14.251,	  p	  =	  .001,	  ηp2	  	  =	  .284).	  	  Adults	  did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  social	  versus	  nonsocial	  scores	  (F(1,36)	  =	  .374,	  p	  =	  .545,	  ηp2	  =	  .010).	  	  Pairwise	  comparisons	  also	  showed	  that	  adolescents	  were	  less	  positive	  than	  were	  adults	  in	  their	  interpretations	  of	  social	  scenarios	  (F(1,36)	  =	  4.615,	  p	  =	  .038,	  ηp2	  	  =	  .114).	  	   	  Nonsocial	  scenarios	  received	  higher	  ratings	  for	  positive	  interpretations	  than	  did	  social	  scenarios	  across	  all	  participant	  groups,	  a	  result	  substantiated	  by	  the	  ANOVA	  (main	  effect	  of	  scenario:	  F(1,36)	  =	  5.038,	  p	  =	  .031,	  ηp2	  	  =	  .123).	  	  However,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  graphs	  you	  can	  see	  that	  this	  main	  effect	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  differences	  in	  adolescent	  scores	  on	  social	  and	  nonsocial,	  whereas	  adult	  scores	  are	  nearly	  equivalent.	  	  A	  main	  effect	  of	  sex	  was	  not	  found,	  and	  sex	  did	  not	  interact	  with	  any	  other	  variable	  (main	  effect	  of	  sex:	  F(1,36)	  =	  1.736,	  p	  =	  .196,	  ηp2	  	  =	  .046;	  scenario	  by	  sex:	  	  F(1,36)	  =	  1.278,	  p	  =	  .266,	  ηp2	  	  =	  .034,	  sex	  by	  age	  group:	  F(1,36)	  =	  .000,	  p	  =	  .995,	  ηp2	  	  =	  .000).	   	  Figure	  3	  (next	  page):	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  Table	  5;	  Mean	  Positive	  Interpretation	  Scores:	  	   Males	   Females	   Adults	   Adolescents	  Overall	   2.9	  ±	  .3	   3.1	  ±	  .5	   3.0	  ±	  .5	   2.9	  ±	  .4	  Social	   2.8	  ±	  .6	   2.9	  ±	  .8	   3.1	  ±	  .8	   2.6	  ±	  .5✚	  Nonsocial	   3.0	  ±	  .5	   3.2	  ±	  .4	   3.0	  ±	  .5	   3.2	  ±	  .4	  
✚	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  scenario	  type	  (p	  <	  .05)	  
	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  age	  group	  (p	  <	  .05)	  	  
4)	  AIBQ:	  Mean	  Belief	  Scores	  (Table	  6)	  The	  mean	  belief	  ratings	  differed	  between	  the	  sexes	  and	  scenarios	  (interaction	  between	  sex	  and	  scenario	  F(1,36)	  =	  9.911,	  p	  =	  .003,	  ηp2=	  .216;	  Figure	  4).	  	  Investigating	  this	  interaction	  through	  pairwise	  comparisons	  showed	  that	  females	  scored	  social	  events	  more	  negatively	  than	  nonsocial	  events	  (F(1,36)	  =	  10.507,	  p	  =	  .003,	  ηp2	  =	  .226).	  Females,	  however,	  were	  not	  statistically	  more	  negative	  in	  mean	  belief	  than	  males	  (main	  effect	  of	  sex	  F(1,36)	  =	  .000,	  p	  =	  .996,	  ηp2	  =	  .000),	  and	  no	  other	  pairwise	  comparisons	  were	  significant.	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  Figure	  4:	  
	  	  The	  age	  by	  scenario	  interaction	  also	  reached	  significance	  (F(1,36)	  =	  4.590,	  p	  =	  .039,ηp2	  =	  .113;	  Figure	  5).	  Pairwise	  comparisons	  showed	  that	  adolescents	  had	  significantly	  lower	  mean	  belief	  scores	  (i.e.	  more	  negative)	  for	  social	  scenarios	  than	  for	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  (F(1,36)	  =	  6.781,	  p	  =	  .013,	  ηp2	  =	  .159),	  and	  that	  adolescents	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  their	  beliefs	  about	  social	  scenarios	  than	  were	  adults	  (F(1,36)	  =	  7.993,	  p	  =	  .008,	  ηp2	  =	  .182).	  	  A	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  age	  was	  also	  found	  in	  the	  ANOVA	  (main	  effect	  of	  age	  group:	  F(1,36)	  =	  5.298,	  p	  =	  .027,	  ηp2	  =	  .128).	  	  Figure	  5	  (next	  page):	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   Together,	  these	  results	  confirm	  that	  adolescents	  had	  significantly	  more	  negative	  beliefs	  for	  social	  events	  than	  for	  nonsocial	  events,	  and	  that	  they	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  their	  beliefs	  for	  social	  scenarios	  than	  adults	  were.	  	  Table	  6,	  Mean	  Belief	  Scores:	  	   Males	   Females	   Adults	   Adolescents	  Social	   2.0	  ±	  .3	   1.9	  ±	  .4✚	   2.1	  ±	  .3	   1.8	  ±	  .4✚	  Nonsocial	   2.0	  ±	  .2	   2.1	  ±	  .3	   2.1	  ±	  .3	   2.0	  ±	  .2	  
✚	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  scenario	  type	  (p	  <	  .05)	  
	  indicates	  significant	  effect	  of	  age	  group	  (p	  <	  .05)	  	  
5)	  QIDA	  (Table	  7)	  Results	   from	   the	   QIDA	   analysis	   show	   that	   interpersonal	   difficulties	   are	   not	  significantly	  different	  between	  either	  age	  group	  (F(1,36)	  =	  .069,	  p	  =	  .794,	  ηp2	  =	  .002)	  or	  sex	  (F(1,36)	  =	  1.237,	  p	  =	  .273,	  ηp2	  =	  .033),	  nor	  was	  there	  an	  interaction	  between	  the	  two:	  F(1,36)	  =	  1.186,	  p	  =	  .283,	  ηp2	  =	  .032.	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  Table	  7,	  Mean	  QIDA	  Scores:	  	  	   Males	   Females	   Adults	   Adolescents	  Mean	  QIDA	   1.4	  ±	  .4	   1.5	  ±	  .5	   1.3	  ±	  .3	   1.6	  ±	  .5	  	  	  
6)	  Bivariate	  Correlations	  (Table	  8)	  The	   likelihood	   that	   negative	   explanations	   would	   occur	   to	   the	   participants	   for	  social	  events	  was	  correlated	  with	  perceived	  difficulty	  in	  interpersonal	  relationships	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  QIDA	  (Pearson	  correlation	  =	  .334,	  p	  =	  .035;	  Figure	  6).	  The	  correlation	  between	   QIDA	   score	   and	   social	   phobia	   subscale	   score	   was	   not	   significant	   (Pearson	  correlation	  =	  .389,	  p	  =	  .090;	  Figure	  7).	  Figures	  6	  and	  7:	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  Both	  mean	  negative	   interpretations	  of	  social	   scenarios	  and	  nonsocial	   scenarios	  correlated	  positively	  and	  strongly	  with	  social	  phobia	  scores	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  RCADS	  in	   adolescents:	   Pearson	   correlation	  =	   .695,	   p	  =	   .001	   (Figure	  8),	   Pearson	   correlation	  =	  .571,	  p	  =	  .009	  (Figure	  9),	  respectively.	  	  Neither	  positive	  interpretation	  scores	  for	  social	  nor	  nonsocial	  were	  correlated	  with	  social	  phobia	  scores	  (positive	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  respectively:	  Pearson	  correlation	  =	  -­‐.176,	  p	  =	  .457;	  Pearson	  correlation	  =	  .180,	  p	  =	  .448).	  	  When	   depression	   is	   included	   as	   a	   covariate,	   negative	   social	   interpretation	   scores	  remain	   positively	   and	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   social	   phobia	   scores:	   Pearson	  correlation	  =	   .661,	  p	  =	   .002.	   	  However,	  negative	  nonsocial	   interpretation	  scores	   fail	   to	  reach	   significance:	   Pearson	   correlation	  =	   .554,	   p	  =	   .014.	   (Alpha-­‐level	  was	   adjusted	  by	  dividing	  by	  four,	  such	  that	  α	  <	  .0125	  was	  considered	  significant).	  	  Table	  8,	  Bivariate	  Correlations	  	   	   Pearson	  Correlation	  QIDA	  x	  Negative	  Social	   	   .334*	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QIDA	  x	  Social	  Phobia	   	   .389	  Social	  Phobia	  x	  AIBQ	  Interpretations	   Negative	  Social	   .695**	  	   	  ’’	  depression	  as	  covariate	   .661**	  	   Negative	  Nonsocial	   .571**	  	   	  ’’	  depression	  as	  covariate	   .554	  	   Positive	  Social	   -­‐.176	  	   Positive	  Nonsocial	   .180	  
	  
*	  indicates	  two-­tailed	  significance	  p	  <	  .05	  
**	  indicates	  two-­tailed	  significance	  p	  <	  .0125	  	  Figures	  8	  and	  9	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DISCUSSION	  	  The	  present	  study	  showed	  sex	  and	  age	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  and	  belief	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios,	  but	  found	  no	  sex	  or	  age	  differences	  in	  perceived	  difficulty	  of	  interpersonal	  relationships.	  	  Our	  first	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  a)	  adolescent	  females	  would	  be	  more	  negative	  and	  b)	  less	  positive	  than	  adolescent	  males	  in	  their	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events.	  	  Hypothesis	  1a)	  was	  supported	  by	  our	  data,	  which	  showed	  that	  in	  comparison	  to	  males,	  females	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  negative	  interpretations	  occur	  to	  them	  during	  ambiguous	  scenarios.	  	  This	  was	  true	  regardless	  of	  scenario	  type	  (social	  or	  nonsocial)	  or	  age	  group	  (adolescent	  or	  adult).	  	  By	  finding	  this	  sex	  difference	  in	  the	  female	  group	  as	  a	  whole	  rather	  than	  in	  adolescents	  only,	  our	  third	  hypothesis—that	  we	  would	  not	  find	  sex	  differences	  in	  adult	  interpretation	  scores—was	  rejected.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  sexes	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  their	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positive	  interpretations,	  which	  contradicts	  hypothesis	  1b)	  that	  adolescent	  females	  would	  be	  less	  positive	  than	  males.	  Our	  second	  hypothesis,	  that	  females	  would	  have	  more	  negative	  mean	  belief	  scores	  than	  males,	  was	  also	  rejected	  by	  our	  data,	  as	  we	  did	  not	  find	  that	  female	  scores	  were	  significantly	  more	  negative	  than	  male	  scores.	  	  However,	  we	  did	  find	  another	  sex	  difference	  in	  mean	  belief	  scores:	  females	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  their	  belief	  scores	  of	  social	  scenarios	  than	  nonsocial,	  whereas	  males	  did	  not	  differ	  by	  scenario	  type.	  	  As	  stated	  above,	  the	  third	  hypothesis,	  that	  no	  sex	  differences	  in	  adult	  interpretation	  scores	  would	  be	  found,	  was	  not	  supported	  by	  our	  data,	  as	  females	  were	  more	  negative	  in	  their	  social	  interpretations	  than	  males.	  	  Our	  fourth	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  a)	  adolescents	  would	  be	  more	  negative	  and	  b)	  less	  positive	  than	  adults	  in	  their	  social	  interpretation	  scores,	  and	  c)	  more	  negative	  in	  mean	  belief	  of	  social	  events.	  	  Hypotheses	  4a)	  and	  4b)	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  data:	  in	  comparison	  to	  adults,	  adolescents	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  negative	  interpretations	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  positive	  interpretations	  of	  social	  scenarios.	  	  Adolescents	  were	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  	  social	  scenarios	  than	  nonsocial,	  whereas	  adults	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  interpretations	  by	  scenario.	  	  In	  addition,	  all	  participants	  had	  more	  positive	  interpretations	  for	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  than	  for	  social	  ones.	  	  However,	  in	  contradiction	  to	  hypothesis	  4c),	  mean	  belief	  scores	  for	  social	  scenarios	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  between	  adults	  and	  adolescents.	  	  Though	  adults	  and	  adolescents	  did	  not	  have	  significantly	  different	  mean	  belief	  scores,	  age	  differences	  in	  beliefs	  did	  indicate	  that	  adolescents	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  negative	  beliefs	  for	  social	  scenarios	  than	  nonsocial,	  whereas	  adults	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  scenario	  beliefs.	  	  	  Our	  fifth	  hypothesis,	  that	  a)	  adolescents	  would	  have	  more	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  than	  adults,	  b)	  female	  adolescents	  would	  have	  more	  interpersonal	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difficulties	  than	  male	  adolescents,	  and	  c)	  adults	  would	  have	  no	  sex	  differences,	  was	  mostly	  rejected	  by	  our	  data,	  which	  found	  no	  sex	  or	  age	  differences	  in	  QIDA	  scores,	  supporting	  only	  part	  b	  of	  the	  hypothesis.	  	  Hypothesis	  6,	  that	  negative	  interpretation	  scores	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  events	  would	  correlate	  with	  interpersonal	  difficulty,	  was	  supported	  by	  our	  data,	  which	  found	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  the	  two,	  implying	  that	  a	  negative	  appraisal	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  scenarios	  co-­‐occurs	  with	  a	  higher	  perceived	  level	  of	  difficulty	  of	  social	  relationships.	  Though	  depression	  and	  generalized	  anxiety	  were	  measured	  in	  all	  participants	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  different	  measures	  were	  used	  for	  the	  adult	  and	  adolescent	  population	  precluding	  us	  from	  controlling	  for	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  scores	  in	  the	  analysis.	  The	  present	  study	  measured	  social	  phobia	  in	  the	  adolescent	  population	  only,	  and	  so	  levels	  of	  social	  phobia	  could	  also	  not	  be	  controlled	  for	  in	  our	  analysis.	  	  	  Although	  we	  were	  unable	  to	  control	  for	  social	  phobia	  and	  depression	  scores,	  we	  were	  able	  to	  conduct	  correlational	  analyses	  on	  social	  phobia	  scores	  and	  interpretation	  bias	  in	  adolescents.	  	  In	  support	  of	  hypotheses	  7b	  and	  c,	  social	  phobia	  scores	  were	  positively	  and	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  negative	  interpretation	  scores	  in	  adolescents	  regardless	  of	  scenario	  type	  (social	  or	  nonsocial).	  	  The	  correlation	  between	  social	  phobia	  and	  negative	  social	  scenario	  interpretations	  remained	  significant	  even	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  depression.	  	  Negative	  nonsocial	  interpretations	  failed	  to	  correlate	  significantly	  with	  social	  phobia	  scores	  once	  depression	  was	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  The	  correlations	  between	  negative	  interpretations	  and	  social	  phobia	  in	  adolescents	  suggest	  that	  social	  phobia	  symptoms	  may	  be	  a	  stronger	  predictor	  of	  negative	  social	  interpretations	  than	  negative	  nonsocial	  interpretations,	  and	  that	  depression	  symptoms	  may	  be	  a	  stronger	  predictor	  of	  negative	  nonsocial	  interpretations	  than	  negative	  social.	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Consistent	  with	  our	  findings	  supporting	  our	  first	  hypothesis	  about	  sex	  differences	  in	  adolescent	  interpretation	  scores,	  both	  Lynn,	  Brown,	  &	  Drtischel	  (2012)	  and	  Miers,	  Blote,	  Bogels,	  &	  Westenberg,	  (2008)	  also	  found	  sex	  differences	  in	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  Both	  studies	  found	  that	  adolescent	  girls	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  boys	  to	  have	  negative	  interpretations	  come	  to	  mind	  as	  possible	  explanations	  for	  ambiguous	  situations.	  	  The	  studies	  also	  found	  that	  girls	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  the	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  social	  events	  than	  nonsocial	  events.	  	  	  Some	  contrasts	  in	  results	  were	  found	  between	  the	  current	  study,	  and	  previous	  findings	  from	  Lynn,	  et	  al.,	  (2012),	  and	  Miers	  et	  al.,	  (2008).	  	  While	  Miers	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  found	  that	  girls	  were	  less	  likely	  than	  boys	  to	  have	  positive	  interpretations	  come	  to	  mind	  for	  either	  scenario	  type,	  both	  Lynn	  and	  colleagues	  (2012)	  and	  the	  present	  study	  found	  that	  the	  sexes	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  positive	  interpretation	  scores.	  	  Miers	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  also	  found	  that	  girls	  and	  boys	  were	  equally	  likely	  to	  have	  negative	  interpretations	  come	  to	  mind	  for	  nonsocial	  situations,	  where	  our	  results	  show	  that	  females	  had	  a	  negative	  bias	  compared	  to	  males	  in	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  as	  well.	  	  Possible	  reasons	  for	  the	  slight	  divergence	  in	  study	  results	  may	  be	  attributable	  to	  the	  difference	  in	  samples	  used	  in	  the	  three	  studies.	  	  While	  both	  Lynn	  et	  al.,	  (2012)	  and	  the	  present	  study	  used	  a	  sample	  of	  self-­‐selected	  adolescents	  with	  a	  full	  range	  of	  social	  phobia	  scores,	  (Miers	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  used	  adolescents	  with	  high	  and	  low	  scores	  of	  social	  phobia	  only.	  	  	   If	  the	  present	  study	  had	  differentiated	  between	  high	  and	  low	  socially	  anxious	  females	  and	  males,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  sex	  difference	  in	  positive	  interpretations	  would	  have	  been	  found.	  	  Though	  it	  did	  not	  reach	  significance	  in	  the	  analysis,	  girls	  in	  the	  current	  study	  rated	  positive	  explanations	  as	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  than	  did	  boys.	  	  
	   47	  
It	  is	  possible	  that,	  given	  a	  larger	  sample	  size,	  a	  significant	  sex	  difference	  in	  positive	  interpretations	  would	  have	  emerged	  in	  our	  analysis,	  with	  positive	  interpretations	  as	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  for	  females	  than	  for	  males	  in	  either	  social	  or	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  then,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  females	  also	  had	  more	  negative	  interpretations	  come	  to	  mind	  than	  males,	  females	  would	  have	  significantly	  higher	  scores	  than	  males	  for	  positive	  and	  negative,	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  females	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  generate	  many	  solutions,	  both	  positive	  and	  negative,	  to	  ambiguous	  events.	  	  	  This	  speculation	  is	  supported	  by	  studies	  investigating	  gender	  differences	  in	  rumination	  (see	  Nolen-­‐Hoeksema	  &	  Girgus,	  1994	  for	  a	  review),	  and	  rumination	  in	  relation	  to	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  (Morrow	  &	  Nolen-­‐Hoeksema,	  1990).	  	  Studies	  examining	  rumination	  in	  both	  adolescents	  and	  adults	  have	  found	  that	  girls	  as	  opposed	  to	  boys	  tend	  to	  ruminate	  more	  in	  response	  to	  life	  events	  (Broderick,	  1998;	  Nolen-­‐Hoeksema,	  Larson,	  &	  Grayson,	  1999),	  and	  that	  rumination	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  disorders	  (Hankin,	  2009;	  Morrow	  &	  Nolen-­‐Hoeksema,	  1990;	  Schwartz	  &	  Koenig,	  1996).	  	  Presently,	  rumination	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  hyper-­‐focused	  on	  the	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  life	  events.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  ruminative	  style	  exhibited	  by	  adolescent	  girls	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  general	  tendency	  toward	  “over-­‐thinking,”	  and	  in	  fact	  begins	  by	  a	  formulation	  of	  all	  possibilities,	  and	  then	  analysing	  each	  potential	  explanation.	  	  Future	  studies	  may	  want	  to	  investigate	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  rumination,	  to	  see	  if	  positive	  explanations	  are	  considered	  and	  then	  dismissed	  in	  response	  to	  life	  events.	  The	  three	  studies	  also	  found	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  scenario,	  with	  all	  adolescents	  more	  likely	  to	  endorse	  positive	  interpretations	  of	  nonsocial	  scenarios	  than	  social.	  Because	  all	  adolescents	  were	  less	  positive	  in	  interpretations	  of	  social	  scenarios,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	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this	  is	  not	  a	  bias	  in	  interpretation	  but	  rather	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  reality	  that	  social	  interactions	  in	  adolescence	  have	  a	  greater	  probability	  of	  being	  negative	  in	  nature.	  	  As	  (Miers,	  Blote,	  &	  Westenberg,	  2010)	  note,	  the	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  exhibited	  by	  socially	  anxious	  youth	  may	  actually	  be	  based	  on	  a	  “kernel	  of	  truth,”	  where	  previous	  experiences	  in	  social	  situations	  proved	  aversive.	  	  For	  instance,	  if	  an	  individual	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  gossip	  among	  his	  or	  her	  peers,	  then	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	  AIBQ	  scenario,	  “two	  classmates,	  who	  are	  standing	  talking	  to	  each	  other,	  look	  at	  you”	  may,	  in	  fact,	  most	  likely	  be	  because	  they	  were	  talking	  about	  you.	  	  A	  negative	  interpretation	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  this	  scenario,	  and	  may	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  a	  distortion	  in	  interpretation.	  	  Though	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  could	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  negative	  events	  experienced	  by	  making	  a	  neutral	  situation	  negative	  through	  a	  bias	  in	  interpretation,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  experiencing	  negative	  life	  events	  actually	  creates	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias.	  	  Some	  studies	  have	  reported	  that	  girls	  experience	  more	  interpersonal	  negative	  life	  events	  (Wagner	  &	  Compas,	  1990),	  which	  could	  translate	  into	  a	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  in	  social	  situations.	  	  Even	  if	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  likely	  that	  at	  all	  social	  interactions	  are	  negative	  during	  adolescence.	  	  An	  interpretation	  bias	  can	  still	  significantly	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  negative	  events	  an	  individual	  perceives	  as	  having	  experienced.	  	  The	  results	  from	  the	  present	  study	  also	  suggest	  that	  this	  interpretation	  bias	  exhibited	  by	  female	  adolescents	  persists	  into	  adulthood:	  the	  young	  adult	  female	  cohort	  was	  also	  more	  negative	  than	  their	  male	  counterparts	  in	  interpretation.	  	  Thus,	  it	  appears	  that	  as	  females	  mature	  through	  adolescence	  and	  into	  young	  adulthood	  they	  become	  less	  negative	  and	  more	  positive	  in	  their	  interpretations,	  but	  they	  remain	  more	  negative	  than	  adult	  males.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  females	  become	  less	  negative	  as	  they	  enter	  young	  adulthood	  implies	  that	  the	  gender	  difference	  in	  adult	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  is	  perhaps	  driven	  by	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factors	  other	  than	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities.	  	  However,	  the	  sample	  of	  young	  adults	  in	  our	  study	  did	  not	  have	  a	  sex	  difference	  in	  depression	  symptoms.	  	  It	  is	  still	  possible	  that	  a	  sex	  difference	  exists	  in	  adult	  individuals	  who	  score	  more	  highly	  on	  depression	  indices.	  However,	  caution	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  drawing	  firm	  conclusions	  from	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study,	  as	  a	  number	  of	  weaknesses	  are	  noted.	  	  First,	  the	  adult	  cohort	  may	  not	  be	  a	  good	  comparison	  group	  for	  the	  adolescence	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  	  The	  study	  was	  not	  longitudinal,	  and	  so	  could	  not	  verify	  the	  cause-­‐effect	  relationship	  of	  negative	  interpretation	  bias	  and	  mood	  disorders.	  	  Neither	  the	  QIDA	  nor	  the	  AIBQ	  have	  been	  verified	  for	  use	  in	  adults,	  and	  therefore	  may	  not	  be	  accurate	  measures	  for	  the	  older	  age	  group.	  	  Wording	  on	  the	  romantic	  relationship	  scenarios	  in	  the	  QIDA	  was	  changed	  after	  the	  first	  seven	  participants,	  adding	  a	  possible	  confounding	  variable	  in	  the	  results.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  sample	  size	  was	  relatively	  small	  given	  the	  number	  of	  variables	  measured.	  	  As	  stated,	  our	  adult	  cohort	  may	  not	  be	  the	  best	  comparison	  group	  for	  the	  adolescents	  included	  in	  the	  study.	  	  While	  all	  adolescents	  were	  British	  (from	  the	  local	  St	  Andrews,	  Fife	  population),	  the	  adults	  were	  recruited	  from	  an	  international	  population	  of	  graduate	  students	  attending	  the	  University	  of	  St	  Andrews	  in	  (Fife,	  Scotland).	  	  Because	  the	  adults	  were	  international,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  language,	  culture,	  and	  nationality	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  differences	  between	  age	  groups	  that	  we	  found.	  	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  not	  known	  what	  proportion	  of	  the	  Scottish	  adolescent	  population	  will	  go	  on	  to	  study	  for	  a	  graduate	  level	  degree,	  and	  so	  levels	  of	  education	  could	  also	  not	  be	  controlled	  for.	  	  	  The	  one-­‐time	  study	  also	  prevents	  a	  definitive	  statement	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  negative	  social	  interpretation	  bias	  precedes	  and	  predicts	  social	  anxiety	  and	  depression,	  whether	  they	  are	  co-­‐occurring,	  or	  if	  the	  negative	  bias	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  mood	  disorder.	  	  As	  the	  present	  study	  was	  not	  longitudinal,	  we	  could	  not	  track	  the	  adolescents’	  changes	  in	  interpretation	  of	  a	  period	  of	  maturation.	  Two	  longitudinal	  studies	  to	  our	  knowledge	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have	  followed	  a	  group	  of	  adolescents	  through	  puberty	  (Calvete,	  2010;	  Mezulis,	  Funasaki,	  Charbonneau,	  &	  Hyde,	  2009),	  which	  revealed	  potentially	  contradictory	  results	  about	  the	  direction	  of	  cause-­‐effect	  of	  mood	  disorders	  and	  cognitive	  vulnerability.	  	  No	  studies	  to	  date	  have	  followed	  adolescents	  through	  the	  end	  of	  puberty	  and	  into	  young	  adulthood.	  	  Furthermore,	  most	  adult	  literature	  on	  interpretation	  bias	  focuses	  on	  the	  difference	  between	  high	  and	  low	  socially	  anxious	  adults,	  but	  our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  further	  investigation	  of	  gender	  differences	  in	  interpretation	  of	  ambiguous	  scenarios	  in	  adults	  with	  a	  range	  of	  mood	  disorder	  symptoms	  may	  be	  needed.	  Another	  weakness	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  interpreting	  the	  adult	  data	  is	  that	  neither	  the	  AIBQ	  nor	  the	  QIDA	  have	  been	  validated	  for	  use	  in	  young	  adult	  populations,	  as	  both	  questionnaires	  have	  only	  been	  validated	  for	  use	  in	  individuals	  through	  the	  age	  of	  18.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  questionnaires	  used	  in	  this	  study	  are	  not	  accurate	  measures	  of	  interpretation	  bias	  and/or	  interpersonal	  difficulty	  in	  young	  adults.	  	  Though	  the	  scenarios	  presented	  on	  the	  AIBQ	  are	  generally	  applicable	  to	  any	  individual	  who	  is	  still	  a	  student	  (as	  all	  the	  adult	  participants	  in	  the	  study	  were)	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  that	  adults	  show	  interpretation	  bias	  in	  slightly	  different	  situations	  than	  do	  adolescents.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  QIDA	  often	  distinguishes	  between	  peer-­‐related	  and	  authority-­‐related	  interpersonal	  situations	  (eg,	  telling	  the	  supermarket	  cashier	  that	  your	  change	  is	  
£5	  short).	  	  For	  a	  young	  adult,	  a	  cashier	  may	  be	  the	  same	  age	  or	  younger,	  and	  so	  may	  not	  present	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  interpersonal	  difficulty	  as	  it	  would	  for	  an	  adolescent,	  who	  is	  most	  likely	  younger	  than	  the	  cashier.	  	  Asserting	  oneself	  to	  others	  who	  are	  of	  the	  same	  age	  or	  younger	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  easier	  than	  asserting	  oneself	  to	  someone	  who	  is	  older.	  	  Another	  drawback	  of	  using	  the	  QIDA	  with	  adults	  is	  that,	  while	  in	  adolescence	  romantic	  relationships	  are	  new	  and	  romantic	  skills	  have	  not	  been	  developed	  fully,	  adults	  will	  have	  had	  more	  experience	  with	  romantic	  relationships.	  	  The	  difficulty	  of	  navigating	  a	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new	  kind	  of	  relationship	  may	  be	  more	  difficult	  than	  dealing	  with	  relationships	  that	  are	  less	  novel,	  making	  romantic	  relationships	  especially	  difficult	  for	  adolescents	  compared	  to	  adults.	  	  	  Additionally,	  the	  romantic	  relationship	  questions	  on	  the	  QIDA	  were	  modified	  from	  their	  original	  version	  to	  reflect	  a	  neutral	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  It	  was	  felt	  that	  since	  the	  study	  was	  not	  questioning	  the	  adolescents	  about	  their	  sexual	  orientation,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  not	  ideal	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  adolescents	  were	  all	  heterosexual,	  that	  the	  questions	  reflecting	  romantic	  relationships	  should	  be	  gender	  and	  orientation	  neutral.	  	  However,	  by	  changing	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  question,	  the	  romantic	  aspect	  may	  have	  been	  made	  less	  salient.	  	  The	  scenario	  “Asking	  a	  person	  to	  the	  movies”	  may	  refer	  to	  either	  a	  platonic	  friend	  or	  a	  romantic	  interest,	  and	  would	  therefore	  may	  potentially	  be	  perceived	  as	  having	  different	  levels	  of	  difficulty	  associated	  with	  each	  different	  interpretation.	  	  After	  the	  first	  seven	  adolescent	  participants	  had	  been	  interviewed,	  the	  researchers	  decided	  to	  change	  the	  sentences	  to	  read,	  “asking	  a	  person	  who	  you	  may	  fancy	  to	  the	  movies”	  to	  highlight	  the	  romantic	  aspect	  of	  the	  question.	  	  Two	  methodological	  issues	  arise	  from	  this	  change.	  	  The	  changes	  in	  the	  wording	  may	  change	  the	  validity	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  questionnaire.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  first	  few	  participants	  may	  not	  have	  answered	  the	  question	  with	  a	  romantic	  relationship	  in	  mind.	  Lastly,	  the	  sample	  size	  was	  relatively	  small,	  especially	  given	  the	  amount	  of	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  The	  small	  sample	  size	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  discern	  whether	  the	  sample	  followed	  a	  normal	  distribution,	  and	  so	  the	  data	  was	  not	  conclusively	  parametric.	  	  To	  correct	  for	  these	  methodological	  shortcomings,	  future	  studies	  might	  consider	  a	  few	  corrections.	  	  The	  Inventory	  of	  Interpersonal	  Problems	  (Bush	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  may	  be	  a	  better	  measure	  to	  use	  in	  future	  studies	  investigating	  interpersonal	  difficulties	  in	  adults.	  	  In	  comparison	  to	  the	  five	  factors	  in	  the	  QIDA	  
	   52	  
(assertiveness,	  romantic	  relationships,	  public	  speaking,	  family	  relationships,	  and	  close	  friendships),	  the	  IIP	  includes	  five	  factors	  from	  the	  spheres	  of	  adult	  relationships,	  and	  asks	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  individuals	  are	  nonassertive,	  detached,	  intrusive,	  self-­‐sacrificing,	  and	  socially	  inhibited.	  	  Future	  research	  might	  also	  investigate	  the	  trajectory	  of	  negative	  cognitive	  styles,	  interpersonal	  difficulty	  and	  mood	  disorders	  throughout	  adolescence	  and	  into	  young	  adulthood.	  Presently,	  some	  research	  groups	  have	  focused	  on	  developing	  cognitive	  behavior	  therapies	  to	  modify	  interpretation	  biases	  in	  depressed	  or	  anxious	  adolescents	  and	  adults.	  	  One	  study	  by	  (Watkins,	  Baeyens,	  &	  Read,	  2009)	  found	  that	  a	  training	  program	  to	  reduce	  over-­‐generalizations	  about	  negative	  events	  effectively	  reduced	  rumination	  and	  depressive	  symptoms	  in	  a	  dysphoric	  adult	  population.	  	  A	  cognitive	  behavior	  therapy	  for	  adolescents	  with	  generalized	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  has	  shown	  that	  group	  therapy	  is	  particularly	  helpful	  in	  alleviated	  social	  anxiety	  symptoms	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  (Herbert	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  Results	  of	  these	  and	  other	  successful	  CBT	  studies	  provide	  optimism	  in	  new	  treatments	  for	  mood	  disorders.	  	  	  
CONCLUSION	  Ultimately,	  the	  results	  from	  the	  present	  study	  support	  the	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  females	  exhibit	  a	  tendency	  to	  interpret	  ambiguous	  scenarios	  in	  a	  negative	  way,	  and	  have	  more	  negative	  beliefs	  about	  social	  scenarios	  in	  comparison	  to	  nonsocial	  scenarios.	  	  Adolescents	  as	  a	  group	  rated	  more	  negative	  interpretations	  as	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  mind	  for	  social	  scenarios	  than	  nonsocial	  scenarios,	  and	  had	  more	  negative	  interpretations	  for	  social	  scenarios	  than	  did	  adults.	  	  For	  adolescents,	  depression	  symptoms	  seemed	  to	  account	  for	  negative	  interpretations	  of	  ambiguous	  nonsocial	  scenarios,	  whereas	  social	  phobia	  scores	  predicted	  negative	  interpretations	  of	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social	  scenarios.	  	  The	  results	  also	  tentatively	  show	  that	  adults	  are	  less	  negatively	  biased	  than	  are	  adolescents,	  but	  more	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  replicate	  this	  finding.	  	  No	  differences	  in	  sex	  or	  age	  were	  found	  for	  perceived	  levels	  of	  interpersonal	  difficulty,	  and	  interpersonal	  difficulty	  was	  also	  not	  correlated	  to	  negative	  social	  interpretation	  scores.	  	  Preliminary	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  cognitive	  behavior	  therapies	  that	  address	  cognitive	  vulnerabilities	  are	  effectual	  treatments	  for	  mood	  disorders,	  highlighting	  the	  need	  for	  further	  research	  and	  development	  in	  cognitive	  vulnerability	  treatments.	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Date: ____________ Name/ID: ___________________ 
RCADS 
 
Please put a circle around the word that shows how often each of these things happen to you. There are 
no right or wrong answers. 
 
1. I worry about things  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
2. I feel sad or empty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
3. When I have a problem, I get a funny feeling in 
my stomach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
4. I worry when I think I have done poorly at 
something . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
5. I would feel afraid of being on my own at home 
 
6. Nothing is much fun anymore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
7. I feel scared when I have to take a test . . . . . . . .  
 
8. I feel worried when I think someone is angry 
with me . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
9.  I worry about being away from my parents . . . .  
 
10. I get bothered by bad or silly thoughts or 
pictures in my mind  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
11. I have trouble sleeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
12. I worry that I will do badly at my school work . 
.  
 
13. I worry that something awful will happen to 
someone in my family  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
14. I suddenly feel as if I can't breathe when there is 
no reason for this  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
15. I have problems with my appetite . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
16. I have to keep checking that I have done things 
right (like the switch is off, or the door is 
locked) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.  
 
17.  I feel scared if I have to sleep on my own.  . . . .  
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 




Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
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18. I have trouble going to school in the mornings 
because I feel nervous or afraid  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
19. I have no energy for things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
20. I worry I might look foolish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
21. I am tired a lot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
22.  I worry that bad things will happen to me . . . . .  
 
23. I can't seem to get bad or silly thoughts out of 
my head.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
24. When I have a problem, my heart beats really 
fast  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
25. I cannot think clearly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
26. I suddenly start to tremble or shake when there 
is no reason for this  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
27. I worry that something bad will happen to me . . 
 
28. When I have a problem, I feel shaky . . . . . . . . .  
 
29. I feel worthless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
30. I worry about making mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
31. I have to think of special thoughts (like numbers 
or words) to stop bad things from happening. . .  
 
32. I worry what other people think of me . . . . . . . .  
 
33. I am afraid of being in crowded places (like 
shopping centers, the movies, buses, busy 
playgrounds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
34. All of a sudden I feel really scared for no reason 
at all  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
35. I worry about what is going to happen . . . . . . .  
 
36. I suddenly become dizzy or faint when there is 
no reason for this  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
37. I think about death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
38. I feel afraid if I have to talk in front of my class  
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 




Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
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39. My heart suddenly starts to beat too quickly for 
no reason  . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
40. I feel like I don’t want to move . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
41. I worry that I will suddenly get a scared feeling 
when there is nothing to be afraid of  . . . . . . . . . 
 
42. I have to do some things over and over again 
(like washing my hands, cleaning or putting 
things in a certain order) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
43. I feel afraid that I will make a fool of myself in 
front of people  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
44. I have to do some things in just the right way to 
stop bad things from happening  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
45. I worry when I go to bed at night . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
46. I would feel scared if I had to stay away from 
home overnight  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
47. I feel restless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 




Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
 
Never Sometimes Often Always 
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DASS. 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not 
spend too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1 I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I just couldn't seem to get going 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I had a feeling of shakiness (eg, legs going to give way) 0      1      2      3 
8 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
9 I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most 
relieved when they ended 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting upset rather easily 0      1      2      3 
12 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
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13 I felt sad and depressed 0      1      2      3 
14 I found myself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way 
(eg: lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting) 
0      1      2      3 
15 I had a feeling of faintness 0      1      2      3 
16 I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I perspired noticeably (eg: hands sweaty) in the absence of high 
temperatures or physical exertion 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life wasn't worthwhile 0      1      2      3 
22 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
23 I had difficulty in swallowing 0      1      2      3 
24 I couldn't seem to get any enjoyment out of the things I did 0      1      2      3 
25 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (eg: sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
26 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
27 I found that I was very irritable 0      1      2      3 
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28 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
29 I found it hard to calm down after something upset me 0      1      2      3 
30 I feared that I would be "thrown" by some trivial but unfamiliar 
task 
0      1      2      3 
31 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
32 I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing 0      1      2      3 
33 I was in a state of nervous tension 0      1      2      3 
34 I felt I was pretty worthless 0      1      2      3 
35 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
36 I felt terrified 0      1      2      3 
37 I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about 0      1      2      3 
38 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
39 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
40 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a 
fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
41 I experienced trembling (eg: in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
42 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
Appen






Adolescents’ Interpretation and Belief Questionnaire (AIBQ) 
 
 
In this questionnaire different situations are described which you might have 
experienced. Written below each situation are three different things a person 
might think in these sorts of situations. A person will usually have a number 
of different thoughts as an explanation for a situation.  
 
Imagine yourself in the following situations. Using the scale provided, 





A few weeks after the beginning of the new school year your teacher 
(mentor) asks to speak to you.  
 
Why does he or she want to speak to you? 
 
He or she wants to tell me that they are very satisfied with my work. 
 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
  
Might pop up 
in my mind 
  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3  5 
 
If you circle a 4 here, it means that the thought that the teacher was 









A few weeks after the beginning of the new school year your teacher 
(mentor) asks to speak to you.  
 
Why does he or she want to speak to you? 
 
 
He or she expected much better work from me and thinks that I need to 
work harder. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 
Might pop up 
in my mind  Definitely pops up in my mind 
1 2  4 5 
 
The 3 here means that the thought that the teacher expected better work 




A few weeks after the beginning of the new school year your teacher 
(mentor) asks to speak to you.  
 
Why does he or she want to speak to you? 
 
 
He or she might want to ask me something.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
 2 3 4 5 
 
The 1 here means that the thought that your school teacher might want to 













In the end, you believe that one thought is more correct than the other 
thoughts. If, in the end, you really believe that your school teacher expected 
better work from you, put a cross next to that thought, as shown below:  
 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• He or she might want to ask me something.  
• He or she expected much better work from me and thinks 
that I need to work harder. 
X 





That was the example. We will now continue with the questionnaire.  
 6 
 
1. You’ve received a new watch with a stopwatch function but you 
can’t get it to work. 
 
Why can’t you get it to work? 
 
I’ve done something wrong and now it’s broken. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Appen




1. You’ve received a new watch with a stopwatch function but you can’t 
get it to work. 
 
Why can’t you get it to work? 
 
 
The watch is just too complicated; no-one would be able to get it to 
work. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 8 
1. You’ve received a new watch with a stopwatch function but you   
can’t get it to work. 
 
Why can’t you get it to work? 
 
 
I just need some more time and then I’ll be able to get it to work  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Appen




Which thought is most believable? 
 
 
• The watch is just too complicated; no-one would be able to 
get it to work. 
 
• I just need some more time and then I’ll be able to get it to 
work 
 

































2. You’ve invited a group of classmates to your birthday party, but a 
few have not yet said if they’re coming. 
 
Why haven’t they said something yet? 
 
They don’t know yet if they can come or not.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
They don’t want to come because they don’t like me. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
They’re definitely coming; they don’t need to tell me that. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• They don’t want to come because they don’t like me.  
• They don’t know yet if they can come or not.  












3. You’ve received bad marks for your last few tests. 
  
Why has this happened?  
 
The tests were really difficult and nearly everybody got bad marks.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
This class is too difficult for me; I’ll have to repeat a year. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I need to work harder and then it’ll be fine.   
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• This class is too difficult for me; I’ll have to repeat a year.  
• The tests were really difficult and nearly everybody got bad 
marks. 
 




4. You’ve just given a presentation in front of your class and 
afterwards no-one asks a question.  
 
Why doesn’t anyone ask a question? 
 
They thought what I said was very clear, and didn’t need to ask 
anything. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
It was nearly lunch so everybody wanted to leave. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They didn’t think my presentation was interesting.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• They didn’t think my presentation was interesting.  
• They thought what I said was very clear, and didn’t need to 
ask anything. 
 











5. You’re going to the cinema because there’s a film you really want to 
see. When you get to the cinema, you see a long queue at the cashier 
for the film you want to see.  
 
What’s going on? 
 
I’ve obviously chosen a really good film, because everybody wants to 
see it.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Because so many people want to see the film, it’ll be sold out before I 
can buy a ticket.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Lots of people want to go to the cinema tonight.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• I’ve obviously chosen a really good film, because 
everybody wants to see it. 
 
• Lots of people want to go to the cinema tonight.  
• Because so many people want to see the film, it’ll be sold 






6. Suddenly, you feel really sick.   
 
Why do you feel sick? 
 
I’ve eaten too many sweets; it’s not that bad, it’ll be over in a minute.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4  
5 
 
I’m really ill; I’ll have to go to the doctor.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Oh, everyone feels sick sometimes.   
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• I am really ill; I’ll have to go to the doctor.  
• Oh, everyone feels sick sometimes.    
















7. Two classmates, who are standing talking to each other, look at you.  
 
Why are they looking at you? 
 
They’re gossiping about me. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They like me and want me to go over and join them. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They just happen to be looking in my direction.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• They like me and want me to go over and join them.  
• They’re gossiping about me.  










8. You’ve locked your bike up somewhere and when you go back for it 
later on, you can’t find it. 
 
Why can’t you find your bike? 
 
It’s been stolen. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I’m looking in the wrong place but it’s definitely around here 
somewhere. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
There are just so many bikes here that it’s difficult to find it.   
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• There are just so many bikes here that it’s difficult to find it.    
• I’m looking in the wrong place but it’s definitely around 
here somewhere. 
 













9. You’re standing with a group of classmates. When you begin to talk, 
no-one looks at you.  
 
Why isn’t anyone looking at you? 
 
They don’t want me hanging around because they don’t like me. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
They just happen to be looking at something else, but they are 
interested in what I have to say. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I should’ve waited until my classmate had finished before I began 
talking.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
• They don’t want me hanging around because they don’t like 
me. 
 
• I should’ve waited until my classmate had finished before I 
began talking. 
 
• They just happen to be looking at something else, but they 






10. You’re standing on your own at a school party and somebody you 
don’t know looks at you.   
 
Why is he or she looking at you? 
 
I stand out like a sore thumb. He or she probably thinks I’m pathetic. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
He or she just happens to be looking in my direction. 
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
He or she likes me and wants to get my attention.  
Doesn’t pop 
up in my 
mind 
 Might pop up in my mind  
Definitely pops 
up in my mind 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Which thought is most believable? 
 
 
• He or she likes me and wants to get my attention.  
• I stand out like a sore thumb. He or she probably thinks I’m 
pathetic. 
 































1 Telling the supermarket cashier that your change is 
£5 short? ............................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
2 Paying a person you fancy compliments? ..........................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
3 Reading out in class a work you’ve prepared? ..................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
4 Asking a waiter to serve you first because it’s your 
turn? ...................................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
5 Giving your opinion in a students’ meeting when you 
don’t agree with what has been said? ................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
6 Telling a stranger who tries to jump the cinema 
queue to wait his/her turn? .................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
7 Asking the teacher in class when you don’t 
understand something she/he’s said? ................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
8 Starting a conversation with a person your age you 
don’t know at the bus stop? ...............................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
9 Giving your opinion when you don’t agree with your 
parents?  ............................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
10 Complaining to a waiter when you are served bad 
food or drinks? ...................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
11 Telling a person you’ve just met that you like the 
way he/she dresses? .........................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
1234 















12 Thanking friends when they stand up for you? ..................  
 0 1 2 3 4 
13 Asking a stranger to put out his/her cigarette 












14 Selling flags in the street for a charity? ..............................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
15 Asking the waiter for information if you have doubts 












16 Voluntarily going up to the blackboard despite 
having prepared for the lesson? .........................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
17 Asking a stranger for directions when lost in an 
unknown area? ...................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
18 Asking at the bank about opening a savings 
account? .............................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
19 Telling a relative (grandparents, uncles and aunts, 
etc.) that you don’t like their practical jokes? .....................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
20 Giving your point of view in front of your 
classmates? .......................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
21 Asking a person out to the cinema? ...................................  
 0 1 2 3 4 
22 Thanking a friend for helping you with a school 
task? ...................................................................................  
 




























23 Standing up for yourself when your parents blame 
you for something you haven’t done? ................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
24 Complaining to neighbors that you can’t study 
because of the noise they’re making? ................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
25 Standing up for yourself when your brother or sister 
blames you for having broken something of theirs 












26 Going up to a person you fancy and introducing 
yourself? .............................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
27 Apologizing to a friend for going over the top in an 
argument? ..........................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
28 Taking back a faulty CD to the shop where it was 
bought? ..............................................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
29 Saying no to a classmate you know well when 
he/she asks to borrow your bike? ......................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
30 Standing up for a friend when he/she is being 
criticized by others? ...........................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
31 Complaining to your parents when they don’t let you 
go on a school trip? ............................................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
32 Having a conversation with a person you fancy? ...............  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
33 Saying no to a beggar who asks you for money? ..............  
 





















34 Asking a stranger for help if you fall off your bike? ............  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
35 Asking a waiter to change the orange juice he’s 












36 Asking a person for a date? ...............................................  
 
0 1 2 3 4 
